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Target-Management-Involved Buyouts: Impact On Takeover Competition, Litigation Risk, And Shareholder Returns

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  • Sridhar Gogineni
  • John Puthenpurackal

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="en"> We examine the impact of target management involvement as bidders in a sample of completed going-private buyouts. Announcement-period and long-run target shareholder returns do not appear to be lower in management-involved deals. We attempt to identify disciplining mechanisms in the takeover process that can explain this result. We find that target shareholder lawsuits are more likely when management is involved, and litigation risk appears to positively affect target returns. We also study a sample of withdrawn buyout deals and find that a significant number of management bids are unsuccessful, further suggesting that safeguards exist in management-involved deals.

Suggested Citation

  • Sridhar Gogineni & John Puthenpurackal, 2014. "Target-Management-Involved Buyouts: Impact On Takeover Competition, Litigation Risk, And Shareholder Returns," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 37(3), pages 323-356, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:37:y:2014:i:3:p:323-356
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    Cited by:

    1. Dai, Ya & Guo, Liang & Kadapakkam, Palani-Rajan, 2019. "Protecting the weak: Efficacy of mandated auctions in minority buyouts," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 9-19.
    2. Matteo P. Arena & Michaël Dewally & Sarah W. Peck, 2020. "Fight or flee: Outside director departures prior to contested management buyout offers," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 274-293, September.
    3. Mittoo, Usha & Ng, Dennis & Yan, Meng, 2020. "Managerial ownership, credit market conditions, undervaluation and offer premiums in management (MBOs) and leveraged buyouts (LBOs)," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    4. Sridhar Gogineni & Pawan Jain, 2021. "The Role of Target Termination Fees in REIT Mergers," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-39, July.
    5. Harford, Jarrad & Stanfield, Jared & Zhang, Feng, 2019. "Do insiders time management buyouts and freezeouts to buy undervalued targets?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 206-231.

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