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Financial Contracting Between Managers And Venture Capitalists: The Role Of Value‐Added Services, Reputation Seeking, And Bargaining Power

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  • Richard Fairchild

Abstract

I analyze manager and venture capitalist bargaining over the financial contract in the face of double‐sided moral hazard problems. The allocation of cash flows depends on the combined effects of value‐added services, reputation seeking, and bargaining power. Welfare is maximized when the venture capitalist has high value‐adding capabilities, the market for reputation is informationally efficient, and the manager has bargaining power. Furthermore, I consider the effect of exit strategies on the financial agreement. I also consider bidding between venture capitalists of differing abilities. Generally, the superior venture capitalist wins with a lower bid, but in some cases the inferior venture capitalist can win.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Fairchild, 2004. "Financial Contracting Between Managers And Venture Capitalists: The Role Of Value‐Added Services, Reputation Seeking, And Bargaining Power," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 27(4), pages 481-495, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:27:y:2004:i:4:p:481-495
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2004.00104.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Koskela, E. & Stenbacka, R., 2000. "Compensation and Bargaining with Entrepreneurship as the Outside Option," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 479, Department of Economics.
    2. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Nasica & Dominique Torre & Dominique Dufour, 2011. "Syndication in private equity industry: comparing the strategies of independent and captive venture capitalists," Post-Print halshs-00720785, HAL.
    2. Fairchild, Richard, 2011. "An entrepreneur's choice of venture capitalist or angel-financing: A behavioral game-theoretic approach," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 359-374, May.
    3. Fu, Hui & Yang, Jun & An, Yunbi, 2019. "Made for each other: Perfect matching in venture capital markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 346-358.
    4. Hana Milanov & Dean A. Shepherd, 2013. "The importance of the first relationship: The ongoing influence of initial network on future status," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(6), pages 727-750, June.
    5. Jan Smolarski & Neil Wilner & Weifang Yang, 2011. "The use of financial information by private equity funds in evaluating new investments," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(1), pages 46-68, February.
    6. Julia Hirsch & Uwe Walz, 2013. "Why do contracts differ between venture capital types?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 511-525, April.
    7. Adil El Fakir & Richard Fairchild & Mohamed Tkiouat & Abderrahim Taamouti, 2023. "A bargaining model for PLS entrepreneurial financing: A game theoretic model using agent‐based simulation," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 1228-1241, April.
    8. Que, Jiangjing & Zhang, Xueyong, 2021. "Money chasing hot industries? Investor attention and valuation of venture capital backed firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

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