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Should Derivatives Be Privileged in Bankruptcy?

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  • PATRICK BOLTON
  • MARTIN OEHMKE

Abstract

Derivatives enjoy special status in bankruptcy: they are exempt from the automatic stay and effectively senior to virtually all other claims. We propose a corporate finance model to assess the effect of these exemptions on a firm's cost of borrowing and incentives to engage in derivative transactions. While derivatives are value‐enhancing risk management tools, seniority for derivatives can lead to inefficiencies: it transfers credit risk to debtholders, even though this risk is borne more efficiently in the derivative market. Seniority for derivatives is efficient only if it provides sufficient cross‐netting benefits to derivative counterparties that provide hedging services.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2015. "Should Derivatives Be Privileged in Bankruptcy?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2353-2394, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:70:y:2015:i:6:p:2353-2394
    DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12201
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael D. Bordo & John V. Duca, 2023. "Broad Divisia Money and the Recovery of U.S. Nominal GDP from the COVID-19 Recession," Working Papers 319, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    2. Spiros Bougheas & Alan Kirman, 2016. "Bank Insolvencies, Priority Claims and Systemic Risk," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Pasquale Commendatore & Mariano Matilla-García & Luis M. Varela & Jose S. Cánovas (ed.), Complex Networks and Dynamics, pages 195-208, Springer.
    3. Ghamami, Samim & Glasserman, Paul & Young, Hobart, 2022. "Collateralized networks," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 107496, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Bruno Biais & Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, 2021. "Variation Margins, Fire Sales, and Information-constrained Optimality [Leverage, Moral Hazard, and Liquidity]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(6), pages 2654-2686.
    5. Martynova, Natalya & Ratnovski, Lev & Vlahu, Razvan, 2020. "Bank profitability, leverage constraints, and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    6. Michael D. Bordo & John V. Duca, 2023. "Money Matters: Broad Divisia Money and the Recovery of Nominal GDP from the COVID-19 Recession," Working Papers 2306, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    7. Samim Ghamami & Paul Glasserman & H. Peyton Young, 2022. "Collateralized Networks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 2202-2225, March.
    8. Söhnke M Bartram & Jennifer Conrad & Jongsub Lee & Marti G Subrahmanyam, 2022. "Credit Default Swaps around the World," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(5), pages 2464-2524.
    9. Mark Wright, 2018. "The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt," 2018 Meeting Papers 928, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Michael D. Bordo & John V. Duca, 2020. "How New Fed Corporate Bond Programs Dampened the Financial Accelerator in the COVID-19 Recession," Working Papers 2029, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    11. Antonio Díaz & Francisco Jareño & Eliseo Navarro, 2022. "Yield curve data choice and potential moral hazard: An empirical exercise on pricing callable bonds," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 2124-2145, April.
    12. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Gromb, Denis & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2020. "The paradox of pledgeability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 591-605.
    13. Schneorson, Oren, 2022. "Interbank credit exposures and financial stability," ESRB Working Paper Series 136, European Systemic Risk Board.
    14. Park, Hyejin, 2021. "Collateral reuse, collateral mismatch, and financial crises," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 367-380.
    15. Park, Hyejin & Kahn, Charles M., 2019. "Collateral, rehypothecation, and efficiency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 34-46.
    16. Bordo, Michael D. & Duca, John V., 2022. "How new Fed corporate bond programs cushioned the Covid-19 recession," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    17. Spiros Bougheas & Alan Kirman, 2018. "Systemic risk and the optimal seniority structure of banking liabilities," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(1), pages 47-54, January.
    18. Quang Nguyen & Trang Kim & Marina Papanastassiou, 2018. "Policy uncertainty, derivatives use, and firm-level FDI," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 49(1), pages 96-126, January.
    19. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Micheler, Eva, 2018. "Resaleable debt and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 485-504.
    20. Pascal François & Weiyu Jiang, 2019. "Credit Value Adjustment with Market-implied Recovery," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 56(2), pages 145-166, October.
    21. Vuillemey, Guillaume & Peltonen, Tuomas A., 2015. "Disentangling the bond–CDS nexus: A stress test model of the CDS market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 32-45.
    22. Jason Donaldson & Denis Gromb & Giorgia Piacentino, 2019. "Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral," 2019 Meeting Papers 157, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    23. Jessie Jiaxu Wang & Agostino Capponi & Hongzhong Zhang, 2022. "A Theory of Collateral Requirements for Central Counterparties," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(9), pages 6993-7017, September.
    24. Bordo, Michael D. & Duca, John V., 2023. "How the new fed municipal bond facility capped municipal-treasury yield spreads in the Covid-19 recession," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

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