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The Manipulation of Executive Stock Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and Backdating

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  • DAVID C. CICERO

Abstract

I identify three option exercise strategies executives engage in, including (i) exercising with cash and immediately selling the shares, (ii) exercising with cash and holding the shares, and (iii) delivering some shares to the company to cover the exercise costs and holding the remaining shares. Stock price patterns suggest executives manipulate option exercises. They use private information to increase the profitability of all three strategies, and likely backdated some exercise dates in the pre‐Sarbanes‐Oxley period to enhance the profitability of the latter two strategies, where the executive's company is the only counterparty. Backdating is associated with reporting of internal control weaknesses.

Suggested Citation

  • David C. Cicero, 2009. "The Manipulation of Executive Stock Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and Backdating," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(6), pages 2627-2663, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:64:y:2009:i:6:p:2627-2663
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01513.x
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    Cited by:

    1. David Yermack, 2017. "Corporate Governance and Blockchains," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 7-31.
    2. Alex Edmans & Luis Goncalves-Pinto & Moqi Groen-Xu & Yanbo Wang, 2018. "Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(11), pages 4099-4141.
    3. Lee Biggerstaff & David C. Cicero & Andy Puckett, 2013. "Unethical Culture, Suspect CEOs and Corporate Misbehavior," NBER Working Papers 19261, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Chester Spatt, 2014. "Security Market Manipulation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 405-418, December.
    5. Heitzman, Shane, 2011. "Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 251-271.
    6. Ilona Babenko & Rik Sen, 2016. "Do Nonexecutive Employees Have Valuable Information? Evidence from Employee Stock Purchase Plans," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(7), pages 1878-1898, July.
    7. Vicky Henderson & Kamil Klad'ivko & Michael Monoyios & Christoph Reisinger, 2017. "Executive stock option exercise with full and partial information on a drift change point," Papers 1709.10141, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
    8. William J. McNally & Andriy Shkilko & Brian F. Smith, 2017. "Do Brokers of Insiders Tip Other Clients?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(2), pages 317-332, February.
    9. Chyz, James A., 2013. "Personally tax aggressive executives and corporate tax sheltering," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 311-328.
    10. Hongfei Tang, 2014. "Are CEO stock option grants optimal? Evidence from family firms and non-family firms around the Sarbanes–Oxley Act," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 251-292, February.
    11. Bradley Benson & Travis Davidson & Hui James & Hongxia Wang, 2022. "Board busyness and corporate payout: are all busy directors the same?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(3), pages 3711-3759, September.
    12. Biggerstaff, Lee & Cicero, David C. & Puckett, Andy, 2015. "Suspect CEOs, unethical culture, and corporate misbehavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 98-121.
    13. Paul M. Guest, 2017. "Executive Compensation and Ethnic Minority Status," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 427-458, July.
    14. Biggerstaff, Lee & Cicero, David & Wintoki, M. Babajide, 2020. "Insider trading patterns," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    15. Korczak, Piotr & Liu, Xicheng, 2014. "Managerial shareholding policies and retention of vested equity incentives," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 116-129.
    16. Pendleton, Andrew & Robinson, Andrew, 2021. "Why walk away from an easy gain in wealth? Evidence from a UK stock option plan," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C).
    17. Burnett, Brian M. & Jorgensen, Bjorn N. & Pollard, Troy J., 2017. "The stock market reaction to losing or gaining foreign private issuer status," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67900, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Izhakian, Yehuda & Yermack, David, 2017. "Risk, ambiguity, and the exercise of employee stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 65-85.
    19. Bradley, Daniel & Cline, Brandon N. & Lian, Qin, 2014. "Class action lawsuits and executive stock option exercise," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 157-172.
    20. Yisong S. Tian, 2017. "Managerial gaming of stock and option grants," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(3), pages 127-152, August.
    21. Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, 2017. "Do Stock Options Overcome Managerial Risk Aversion? Evidence from Exercises of Executive Stock Options," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(9), pages 3057-3071, September.
    22. David Yermack, 2015. "Corporate Governance and Blockchains," NBER Working Papers 21802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Lorenz, Johannes & Diller, Markus & Sureth, Caren, 2021. "The epidemiology of tax avoidance narratives," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 268, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    24. Stacey Beaumont & Raluca Ratiu & David Reeb & Glenn Boyle & Philip Brown & Alexander Szimayer & Raymond Silva Rosa & David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris & Bryan Howieson & Zoltan Ma, 2016. "Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 685-771, December.
    25. Shahab, Yasir & Wang, Chong-xiao & Yeung, P. Eric & Zhou, Jia-nan, 2024. "The National Team: Stock market interventions and corporate catering behavior," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

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