IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfinan/v63y2008i3p1399-1436.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • ANDRES ALMAZAN
  • SANJAY BANERJI
  • ADOLFO DE MOTTA

Abstract

We provide a theory of informal communication—cheap talk—between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value. The theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock‐based compensation, the presence of informed trading, and the liquidity of the stock. Our results are consistent with the existence of positive announcement effects produced by apparently innocuous corporate events (e.g., stock dividends, name changes).

Suggested Citation

  • Andres Almazan & Sanjay Banerji & Adolfo De Motta, 2008. "Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1399-1436, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:63:y:2008:i:3:p:1399-1436
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01361.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01361.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01361.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pabst, Stefan & Mohnen, Alwine, 2021. "On founders and dictators: Does it pay to pay for signals in crowdfunding?," Journal of Business Venturing Insights, Elsevier, vol. 15(C).
    2. Xi He & Mingsheng Li & Jing Shi & Garry Twite, 2016. "Why do firms pay stock dividends: Is it just a stock split?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 41(3), pages 508-537, August.
    3. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
    4. Josef Schroth, 2020. "Outside Investor Access to Top Management: Market Monitoring versus Stock Price Manipulation," Staff Working Papers 20-43, Bank of Canada.
    5. Sheridan Titman & Chishen Wei. Wei & Bin Zhao, 2021. "Corporate Actions and the Manipulation of Retail Investors in China: An Analysis of Stock Splits," NBER Working Papers 29212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Edmans, Alex & Huang, Chong & Heinle, Mirko, 2013. "The Real Costs of Disclosure," CEPR Discussion Papers 9637, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Park, Na Young, 2016. "Domain-specific risk preference and cognitive ability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 1-4.
    8. Titman, Sheridan & Wei, Chishen & Zhao, Bin, 2022. "Corporate actions and the manipulation of retail investors in China: An analysis of stock splits," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 762-787.
    9. Vollmer, Hendrik, 2016. "Financial numbers as signs and signals: Looking back and moving forward," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 17(2), pages 32-38.
    10. Richard Whittington & Basak Yakis-Douglas & Kwangwon Ahn, 2016. "Cheap talk? Strategy presentations as a form of chief executive officer impression management," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(12), pages 2413-2424, December.
    11. Ferreira, Daniel & Ferreira, Miguel A. & Raposo, Clara C., 2011. "Board structure and price informativeness," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 523-545, March.
    12. Daniel Ferreira & Gustavo Manso & André C. Silva, 2014. "Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to Go Public or Private," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(1), pages 256-300, January.
    13. Ulrike Malmendier, 2018. "Behavioral Corporate Finance," NBER Working Papers 25162, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Najah Attig & Wenyao Hu & Mohammad M. Rahaman & Ashraf Al Zaman, 2023. "Overselling corporate social responsibility," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 52(3), pages 573-610, September.
    15. Bingler, Julia Anna & Kraus, Mathias & Leippold, Markus & Webersinke, Nicolas, 2024. "How cheap talk in climate disclosures relates to climate initiatives, corporate emissions, and reputation risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    16. Mamatzakis, Emmanuel & Zhang, Xiaoxiang & Wang, Chaoke, 2016. "Invisible hand discipline from informed trading: Does market discipline from trading affect bank capital structure?," MPRA Paper 76215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Todd W. Moss & Donald O. Neubaum & Moriah Meyskens, 2015. "The Effect of Virtuous and Entrepreneurial Orientations on Microfinance Lending and Repayment: A Signaling Theory Perspective," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 39(1), pages 27-52, January.
    18. Park, Na Young, 2020. "Trust and trusting behavior in financial institutions: Evidence from South Korea," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 408-419.
    19. Erfan Rezvani & Christian Rojas, 2022. "Firm responsiveness to consumers' reviews: The effect on online reputation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 898-922, November.
    20. Nemanja Antić & Nicola Persico, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Endogenous Conflict of Interest," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2663-2695, November.
    21. Wellalage, Nirosha Hewa & Locke, Stuart, 2020. "Formal credit and innovation: Is there a uniform relationship across types of innovation?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 1-15.
    22. Karapandza, Rasa, 2016. "Stock returns and future tense language in 10-K reports," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 50-61.
    23. María Gutiérrez & Nino Papiashvili & Josep A. Tribó & Antonio B. Vazquez, 2020. "Managerial incentives for attracting attention," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(4), pages 896-937, September.
    24. Lin, Ji-Chai & Stephens, Clifford P. & Wu, YiLin, 2014. "Limited attention, share repurchases, and takeover risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 283-301.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:63:y:2008:i:3:p:1399-1436. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/afaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.