IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jemstr/v7y1998i1p139-142.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Health‐Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply

Author

Listed:
  • Ching‐to Albert Ma

Abstract

I reconsider the implementation of efficient cost and quality efforts when health‐care providers may refuse services to consumers, and introduce a mechanism that is a combination of prospective payment and cost reimbursement. Conditions are derived for the prospective payment level and the margin above cost reimbursement for the implementation of efficient efforts.

Suggested Citation

  • Ching‐to Albert Ma, 1998. "Health‐Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 139-142, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:7:y:1998:i:1:p:139-142
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00139.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00139.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00139.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
    2. Rajiv L. Sharma, 1998. "Health‐Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Comment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 127-137, March.
    3. repec:bla:jemstr:v:3:y:1994:i:1:p:93-112:a is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2014. "The adverse effects of value-based purchasing in health care: dynamic quantile regression with endogeneity," Discussion Papers 14-006, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    2. Brigitte Dormont & Carine Milcent, 2005. "How to Regulate Heterogeneous Hospitals?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 591-621, September.
    3. Brigitte Dormont & Carine Milcent, 2002. "Quelle régulation pour les hôpitaux publics français ?," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 17(2), pages 117-142.
    4. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "The optimal payment system for hospitals under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability," Working Papers 2019-04, CRESE.
    5. Martin Chalkley & Hugh Gravelle & Nikita Jacob & Rita Santos & Luigi Siciliani, 2022. "This paper constitutes the first and foundational output of the ESHCRU2 project 3 - Analysis of purcher-provider contracts: modelling risk sharing and incentive implications. In this project, we have ," Working Papers 187cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    6. Somi Shin & Christoph Schumacher & Eberhard Feess, 2017. "Do Capitation‐based Reimbursement Systems Underfund Tertiary Healthcare Providers? Evidence from New Zealand," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(12), pages 81-102, December.
    7. Feess, Eberhard & Ossig, Sonja, 2007. "Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 423-441, December.
    8. Brigitte Dormont & Carine Milcent, 2005. "How to Regulate Heterogeneous Hospitals?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 591-621, September.
    9. Carine Milcent & Dormont Brigitte, 2000. "Prospective payment system and costs of hospital stays [Coûts hospitaliers et tarification par pathologie - Le cas de l'infarctus du myocarde aigu]," Post-Print halshs-01990635, HAL.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5426 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2016. "Differential Effects of Declining Rates in a Per Diem Payment System," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(12), pages 1599-1618, December.
    12. Brigitte Dormont & Carine Milcent, 2004. "The sources of hospital cost variability," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(10), pages 927-939, October.
    13. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2015. "The adverse effects of incentives regulation in health care: a comparative analysis with the U.S. and Japanese hospital data," Working Papers w0218, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    14. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2015. "The adverse effects of incentives regulation in health care: a comparative analysis with the U.S. and Japanese hospital data," Working Papers w0218, New Economic School (NES).
    15. David E. M. Sappington & Tracy R. Lewis, 1999. "Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 351-382, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Amir Shmueli & Jacob Glazer, 1999. "Addressing the inequity of capitation by variable soft contracts," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(4), pages 335-343, June.
    2. François MARECHAL & Michel MOUGEOT, 2004. "Risk sharing and moral hazard under prospective payment to hospitals: how to reimburse services for outlier patients," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 04.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    3. David E. M. Sappington & Tracy R. Lewis, 1999. "Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 351-382, September.
    4. Nuscheler, Robert & Roeder, Kerstin, 2015. "Financing and funding health care: Optimal policy and political implementability," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 197-208.
    5. Seungchul Lee & Robert Rosenman, 2013. "Reimbursement and Investment: Prospective Payment and For-Profit Hospitals’ Market Share," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 503-518, December.
    6. Étienne Dumont & Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2012. "Chapitre 9 : Rémunération mixte et comportement professionnel des spécialistes," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01114074, HAL.
    7. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 419-443, May.
    8. Christophe Lemiére & Gaute Torsvik & Ottar Mæstad & Christopher H. Herbst & Kenneth L. Leonard, 2013. "Evaluating the Impact of Results-Based Financing on Health Worker Performance: Theory, Tools and Variables to Inform an Impact Evaluation," Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) Discussion Paper Series 98269, The World Bank.
    9. Kümpel, Christian & Schneider, Udo, 2020. "Additional reimbursement for outpatient physicians treating nursing home residents reduces avoidable hospital admissions: Results of a reimbursement change in Germany," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(4), pages 470-477.
    10. Martin Chalkley, 2012. "Contracts, Information and Incentives in Health Care," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2008. "Policy Analysis in Health-Services Market: Accounting for Quality and Quantity," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 91-92, pages 293-319.
    12. Jasmin Kantarevic & Boris Kralj, 2016. "Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and Its Application in Ontario," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(10), pages 1326-1340, October.
    13. Miller, Nolan, 2004. "Market Structure, Commitment, and Treatment Incentives in Health Care," Working Paper Series rwp04-007, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    14. Paolo Pertile, 2008. "Investment in Health Technologies in a Competitive Model with Real Options," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 923-952, October.
    15. Karen Eggleston & Winnie Yip, 2004. "Hospital Competition under Regulated Prices: Application to Urban Health Sector Reforms in China," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 343-368, December.
    16. Yaesoubi, Reza & Roberts, Stephen D., 2011. "Payment contracts in a preventive health care system: A perspective from Operations Management," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1188-1196.
    17. Nolan Miller & Karen Eggleston & Richard Zeckhauser, 2006. "Provider choice of quality and surplus," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 103-117, June.
    18. Beitia, Arantza, 2003. "Hospital quality choice and market structure in a regulated duopoly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 1011-1036, November.
    19. Bardey David & Cremer Helmuth & Lozachmeur Jean-Marie, 2012. "Doctors' Remuneration Schemes and Hospital Competition in a Two-Sided Market," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, November.
    20. Oddvar Kaarboe & Luigi Siciliani, 2011. "Multi‐tasking, quality and pay for performance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 225-238, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:7:y:1998:i:1:p:139-142. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.