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Exclusive content in two‐sided markets

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  • Akifumi Ishihara
  • Ryoko Oki

Abstract

This study investigates the role of exclusive content provision in two‐sided markets in which both sides are allowed to join multiple platforms. We consider a model of duopolistic two‐sided platform market with a monopolistic multiproduct firm (content provider) on one side and consumers on the other. The model demonstrates that the monopolistic content provider uses exclusivity as strategic commitment to balance two opposite effects on its bargaining power: the positive effect caused by the increase in multihoming consumers and the negative effect caused by the restriction of distribution channels.

Suggested Citation

  • Akifumi Ishihara & Ryoko Oki, 2021. "Exclusive content in two‐sided markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 638-654, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:30:y:2021:i:3:p:638-654
    DOI: 10.1111/jems.12427
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ricard Gil & Frederic Warzynski, 2015. "Vertical Integration, Exclusivity, and Game Sales Performance in the US Video Game Industry," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(suppl_1), pages 143-168.
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    5. Leonardo Madio & Carroni, Elias & Shekhar, Shiva, 2019. "Superstars in two-sided markets: exclusives or not?," 2019 Papers pma2756, Job Market Papers.
    6. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2007. "Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 353-380, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shekhar Shiva, 2021. "Platform Pricing Choice: Exclusive Deals or Uniform Prices," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(3), pages 159-186, September.
    2. Bruno Jullien & Alessandro Pavan & Marc Rysman, 2021. "Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects," Post-Print hal-03828345, HAL.
    3. Holler Marit, 2022. "Welfare Effects of Platforms’ Exclusivity Clauses," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(3), pages 143-170, October.
    4. Fuyuki Saruta, 2022. "Exclusive Contracts and Multihoming Agents in Two-sided Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2022-26, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    5. Shekhar, Shiva, 2022. "Platform pricing choice : Exclusive deals or uniform prices," Other publications TiSEM 591d4e4d-f618-49bd-986f-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Saruta, Fuyuki, 2021. "Exclusive contracts and multihoming agents in two-sided markets," MPRA Paper 110070, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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