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Managerial Conservatism and Rational Information Acquisition

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  • Rasmusen, Eric

Abstract

Managerial behavior that is rational and profit-maximizing sometimes will seem to be overly conservative. If the valuation of innovations contains white noise and the status quo would be preferred to random innovation, then any innovation that does not appear substantially better than the status quo should be rejected, for reasons arising from regression toward the mean. The more successful the firm, the higher is the optimal acceptance threshold and conservative bias. Other things equal, more successful firms will spend less on research, adopt fewer innovations, and be less likely to advance the industry's best practice. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Rasmusen, Eric, 1992. "Managerial Conservatism and Rational Information Acquisition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 175-201, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:1:y:1992:i:1:p:175-201
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00175.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David Hirshleifer, 2008. "Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(5), pages 856-874, November.
    2. Michael G. Pollitt, 2015. "In Search of ‘Good’ Energy Policy: The Social Limits to Technological Solutions to Energy and Climate Problems," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1537, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Richard M. Cyert & Praveen Kumar, 1996. "Strategies for Technological Innovation with Learning and Adaptation Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 25-67, March.
    4. Rasmusen, Eric, 1995. "Predictable and unpredictable error in tort awards: The effect of plaintiff self-selection and signaling," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 323-345, September.
    5. David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 2002. "An Economic Approach to the Psychology of Change: Amnesia, Inertia, and Impulsiveness," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 379-421, September.
    6. Eric Rasmusen, 1995. "``Predictable and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards: The Effect of Plaintiff Self Selection and Signalling,''," Law and Economics 9506003, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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