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Workers' Savings And The Right To Manage

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  • Donald A.R. George

Abstract

Most Western capitalist institutions are islands of fascism in a sea of democracy. But democracy can be introduced from the political to the economic sphere by re‐assigning the right to manage from capital owners to workers, thereby creating a sector consisting of self‐managed firms. Such firms require external finance for efficiency; this can be supplied via a new form of financial asset (performance bonds), to be held by wage‐earners' investment funds. Reforms such as these could improve productivity and the quality of working life, strengthen the role of markets and help to deal with the so‐called pensions crisis. These reforms would threaten the interests of private capital owners and would therefore require decisive political action: they can thus be differentiated sharply from voluntary, enterprise‐level schemes for introducing profit‐sharing, employee share‐ownership or industrial democracy.

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  • Donald A.R. George, 2007. "Workers' Savings And The Right To Manage," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 534-552, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:21:y:2007:i:3:p:534-552
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00513.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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