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Collective Action Cascades: An Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers

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  • Susanne Lohmann

Abstract

Self‐interested individuals pursue their goals rationally taking into account the constraints imposed by their environment and best‐responding to the strategic behavior of other individuals: when applied to collective action, economic theory predicts undersupply. Meanwhile, the behavior of masses of people is described as excitable, emotional, irrational, suggestible, hypnotic, disorderly, and unpredictable: in practice, it seems, collective action is oversupplied, and erratically so. The contagious and volatile dynamics of collective action appear to defy rationalization. I conceptualize a social movement as a dynamic informational cascade. Turbulencies emerge endogenously from rational individual behavior. Disorderly mass behavior is a by‐product of a powerful decentralized mechanism of information aggregation.

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  • Susanne Lohmann, 2000. "Collective Action Cascades: An Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 655-684, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:14:y:2000:i:5:p:655-684
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00128
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis, 2012. "An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 497-515, June.
    2. Kishishita, Daiki & Yamagishi, Atsushi, 2021. "Contagion of populist extremism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    3. Micael Castanheira, 2003. "Why Vote For Losers?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1207-1238, September.
    4. McMurray, Joseph, 2017. "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 199-223.
    5. Carmen Camacho & Waleed Hassan, 2023. "People Get Ready: Optimal timing of Revolution," Working Papers halshs-03372991, HAL.
    6. Strulik Holger, 2007. "Steht auf, wenn ihr Deutsche seid!: Sozio-ökonomische Erklärungsansätze der neuen Patriotismuswelle anläßlich der Fußball-WM," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 58(2), pages 151-163, August.
    7. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 214-251.
    8. Carmen Camacho & Waleed Hassan, 2023. "People Get Ready: Optimal timing of Revolution," PSE Working Papers halshs-03372991, HAL.

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