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The Peacock'S Tail: Why Is An Extremist So Sexy?

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  • HIDEAKI MURASE

Abstract

In democracies, ideological politicians often win elections. This phenomenon contradicts the Median Voter Theorem. I propose a model of election to explain this puzzle. Ideology can be a signal of ability, and if the benefits of ability outweigh the costs of ideology the electorate will prefer ideological politicians. Meanwhile, politicians disguise their ideology even if such disguise is costly. Under certain conditions, the most extreme politician is the most likely to be elected. Further, stiffer electoral competition can harm the electorate. These results contrast sharply with the standard belief that politicians’ desire to gain office leads to their ideological convergence.

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  • Hideaki Murase, 2004. "The Peacock'S Tail: Why Is An Extremist So Sexy?," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(3), pages 321-330, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:55:y:2004:i:3:p:321-330
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2004.00284.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wittman, Donald, 1983. "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 142-157, March.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    3. Nöldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Strategic Choice Handicaps when Females Pay the Cost of the Handicap," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 22/2001, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
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