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Negotiating Brexit: The Cultural Sources of British Hard Bargaining

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  • Benjamin Martill
  • Uta Staiger

Abstract

Though the UK is weaker than the EU on key metrics of bargaining power, the British approach to the first phase of the Brexit negotiations has been characterized by hard bargaining. Efforts to explain this puzzle have focused on constraints at the domestic level, but have not engaged with the cultural sources of bargaining style highlighted by constructivist scholars. Drawing on a series of interviews, this article suggests a number of cultural factors have influenced the UK's decision to adopt a hard bargaining strategy, including the country's majoritarian institutional culture, its weak socialization into the EU, overstated perceptions of its own capabilities, the prevailing conservative political ideology, and a longstanding preference for ‘divide and rule’ diplomatic strategies. Our findings suggest not only that the UK's choice of negotiating strategy is sub‐optimal but also that theories of bargaining need to pay attention to cultural factors predisposing actors to particular strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Martill & Uta Staiger, 2021. "Negotiating Brexit: The Cultural Sources of British Hard Bargaining," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 261-277, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:59:y:2021:i:2:p:261-277
    DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13059
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, 2023. "In Quest for Discursive Legitimation of Ongoing Policy Processes: Constructing Brexit as a Success Story," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 815-833, May.
    2. Benjamin Martill, 2021. "Deal or no Deal: Theresa May's Withdrawal Agreement and the Politics of (Non‐)Ratification," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(6), pages 1607-1622, November.
    3. Uta Staiger & Robert Schütze, 2022. "The Past, Present and Future of Brexit: An Introduction," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 13(S2), pages 5-8, April.
    4. Karen Jackson, 2021. "An analysis of the trade policy review of the European Union," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(12), pages 3482-3491, December.

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