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Veto Players and Decision‐making in the EU After Nice

Author

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  • George Tsebelis
  • Xenophon Yataganas

Abstract

The Treaty of Nice introduced a triple majority requirement for Council decisions. In order to be valid, Council decisions require not only a qualified majority (slightly larger than before), but also an absolute majority of Member States and, at a country’s request, a 62 per cent majority of the total population of EU countries. We explain why this significant modification of the rules occurred and what the likely consequences are. The triple majority requirement was introduced because the approaching enlargement of the EU differentiates for the first time between the three majoritarian criteria (weighted votes in the Council, majority of countries, and majority of the population). Different countries have insisted on each of these criteria and the final outcome is an explicit incorporation of all three. The likely outcomes of this change in rules are increased difficulty of legislative decisions, a shift of veto powers in favour of the Council, an increased role for the judiciary, and a further bureaucratization of the EU.

Suggested Citation

  • George Tsebelis & Xenophon Yataganas, 2002. "Veto Players and Decision‐making in the EU After Nice," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 283-307, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:283-307
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00355
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    Cited by:

    1. Csaba, László, 2006. "A stabilitási és növekedési egyezmény új politikai gazdaságtanáról [On the new political economy of the Stability and Growth Pact]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 1-30.
    2. Jorge M. Streb & Gustavo Torrens, 2011. "La economía política de la política fiscal," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 455, Universidad del CEMA.
    3. Jenny Helstroffer & Marie Obidzinski, 2014. "Codecision procedure biais: the European legislation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 29-46, August.
    4. Thomas König & Thomas Bräuninger, 2004. "Accession and Reform of the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(4), pages 419-439, December.
    5. Fabio Franchino, 2013. "Challenges to liberal intergovernmentalism," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 324-337, June.
    6. Běla Plechanovová, 2011. "Coalitions in the EU Council: Pitfalls of Multidimensional Analysis," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 249-266, November.
    7. Moo Sung Lee, 2004. "The European Union beyond 2004: Small States and Trade Policy," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 19-35, March.
    8. Magnus Lundgren & Theresa Squatrito & Jonas Tallberg, 2018. "Stability and change in international policy-making: A punctuated equilibrium approach," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 547-572, December.
    9. Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon, 2011. "Coalition Formation and Agenda Setting in EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement," Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po 5, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris.
    10. Robin Hertz & Dirk Leuffen, 2011. "Too big to run? Analysing the impact of enlargement on the speed of EU decision-making," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 193-215, June.
    11. Trofimov, Ivan D., 2017. "Political economy of trade protection and liberalization: in search of agency-based and holistic framework of policy change," MPRA Paper 79504, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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