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Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions

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  • Andrew Moravcsik
  • Kalypso Nicolaïdis

Abstract

This article offers a basic explanation of the process and outcome of negotiating the Treaty of Amsterdam. We pose three questions: What explains the national preferences of the major governments? Given those substantive national preferences, what explains bargaining outcomes among them? Given those substantive bargains, what explains the choice of international institutions to implement them? We argue in favour of an explanation based on three elements. Issue‐specific interdependence explains national preferences. Interstate bargaining based on asymmetrical interdependence explains the outcomes of substantive negotiation. The need for credible commitments explains institutional choices to pool and delegate sovereignty. Other oft‐cited factors – European ideology, supranational entrepreneurship, technocratic considerations, or the random flux and non‐rational processes of ‘garbage can’ decision‐making – play secondary roles. Remaining areas of ambiguity are flagged for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 1999. "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 59-85, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:59-85
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00150
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Konig & Jonathan Slapin, 2004. "Bringing Parliaments Back in," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 357-394, July.
    2. Henry Farrell & Adrienne Héritier, 2006. "Codecision and Institutional Change," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 41, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    3. Paul W. Thurner & Eric Linhart, 2004. "Political Multilevel Negotiations and Issue Linkage During an EU Intergovernmental Conference: An Empirical Application," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 243-266, November.
    4. Arne Niemann, 2006. "Explaining visa, asylum and immigration policy Treaty revision: insights from a revised neofunctionalist framework," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0005, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science.
    5. Maas, W.M., 2008. "Fleeing to Europe," ISS Working Papers - General Series 18740, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    6. Fabio Franchino, 2013. "Challenges to liberal intergovernmentalism," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 324-337, June.
    7. Jørgen Bølstad & James P. Cross, 2016. "Not all Treaties are Created Equal: The Effects of Treaty Changes on Legislative Efficiency in the EU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(4), pages 793-808, July.
    8. Martijn Mos, 2014. "Of Gay Rights and Christmas Ornaments: The Political History of Sexual Orientation Non-discrimination in the Treaty of Amsterdam," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 632-649, May.
    9. Ripoll Servent, Ariadna and Amy Busby, 2013. "Introduction: Agency and influence inside the EU institutions," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 17, July.
    10. Saam, Nicole J. & Sumpter, David, 2008. "EU institutional reforms: How do member states reach a decision," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 71-86.
    11. Thomas König & Daniel Finke, 2007. "Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 153-176, June.
    12. Paul Schure & Francesco Passerelli & David Scoones, 2007. "When the Powerful Drag Their Feet," Department Discussion Papers 0703, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    13. Berthold Rittberger, 2003. "Removing conceptual blinders: Under what conditions does the ‘democratic deficit’ affect institutional design decisions?," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0023, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science.
    14. Hungdah Su, 2007. "Politics of differentiation: enhanced cooperation in the EU and the pathfinder in APEC," Asia Europe Journal, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 51-66, March.
    15. Nicolas Jabko, 2004. "The Importance of Being Nice: An Institutionalist Analysis of French Preferences on the Future of Europe," Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po 2, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris.

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