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The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance

Author

Listed:
  • Liang Han
  • Stuart Fraser
  • David J. Storey

Abstract

Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentive‐compatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self‐selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self‐Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self‐Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting‐by‐observed‐risk or the sorting‐by‐private information paradigms on their own.

Suggested Citation

  • Liang Han & Stuart Fraser & David J. Storey, 2009. "The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3‐4), pages 424-455, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:36:y:2009:i:3-4:p:424-455
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02132.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Felix Bracht & Jeroen Mahieu & Steven Vanhaverbeke, 2023. "The signaling value of legal form in debt financing," CEP Discussion Papers dp1914, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Oh, Seungjoon & Lee, Jaeyoon & Choi, Bong-Geun, 2021. "The collateral channel: Dynamic effects of housing market on entrepreneurship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    3. Nick Wilson & Mike Wright, 2013. "Private Equity, Buy-outs and Insolvency Risk," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(7-8), pages 949-990, September.
    4. Dias Duarte, Fábio & Matias Gama, Ana Paula & Paulo Esperança, José, 2017. "Collateral-based in SME lending: The role of business collateral and personal collateral in less-developed countries," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 406-422.
    5. Felix Bracht & Jeroen Mahieu & Steven Vanhaverbeke, 2022. "The signaling value of legal form in debt financing," POID Working Papers 052, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    6. Hanan Morsy & Amira El-Shal & Andinet Woldemichael, 2019. "Working Paper 317 - Women Self-Selection out of the Credit Market in Africa," Working Paper Series 2443, African Development Bank.
    7. Gallurt, Jesus & Pombo, Pablo & Ramirez, Jesus & Molina, Horacio, 2012. "La asimetria de la informacion en la crisis financiera, el racionamiento del credito y la garantia como mecanismo simbiotico del sistema [The information asymmetry in the financial crisis, credit r," MPRA Paper 39773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Hubert Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2015. "Capital Structure of Microfinance Institutions," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 313-340, June.
    9. Honjo, Yuji & Ono, Arito & Tsuruta, Daisuke, 2024. "The effect of physical collateral and personal guarantees on business startups," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    10. Morsy, Hanan & El-Shal, Amira & Woldemichael, Andinet, 2019. "Women Self-Selection out of the Credit Market in Africa," MPRA Paper 100395, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Ashiqur Rahman & Jaroslav Belas & Tomas Kliestik & Ladislav Tyll, 2017. "Collateral requirements for SME loans: empirical evidence from the Visegrad countries," Journal of Business Economics and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(4), pages 650-675, July.
    12. Bracht, Felix & Mahieu, Jeroen & Vanhaverbeke, Steven, 2023. "The signaling value of legal form in debt financing," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121335, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Bart M. Lambrecht, 2009. "Discussion of The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3‐4), pages 456-460, April.

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