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A stability property in social choice theory

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  • Donald E. Campbell
  • Jerry S. Kelly
  • Shaofang Qi

Abstract

A social choice function g is stable if whenever an alternative x is selected at profile u and then profile u* is constructed from u by only switching x with yfor one individual i who has y just below x at u, then rule g selects either x or y at u* and not some third alternative. Stability is strictly weaker than strategy†proofness but strong enough to establish two kinds of impossibility theorems.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly & Shaofang Qi, 2018. "A stability property in social choice theory," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 14(1), pages 85-95, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:14:y:2018:i:1:p:85-95
    DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12141
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    Cited by:

    1. Gori, Michele, 2021. "Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 350-369.
    2. Kelly, Jerry S., 2020. "Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 150-155.

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