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Stock pledging and firm risk: Evidence from India

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  • Yogesh Chauhan
  • Ajay Kumar Mishra
  • Ronald W. Spahr

Abstract

Pledging of personally held common stock is widespread in India, where pledging often serves as lender collateral for large shareholder and promoter personal debt acquisitions. This practice is exacerbated by high ownership concentrations in India, as promoters, often firm founders, control, on average, 51% of their firms’ equity. We examine promoter stock pledging impacts on stock volatility, capital investment decisions, and firm performance, using a sample of 1,452 Indian firms. We find that pledging relatively large proportions of outstanding shares and substantial proportions of shares held by promoters exacerbates stock volatility, fosters lower risk capital investments, adversely affects firm values, and impedes longer‐term performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Yogesh Chauhan & Ajay Kumar Mishra & Ronald W. Spahr, 2021. "Stock pledging and firm risk: Evidence from India," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(1), pages 261-280, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:finmgt:v:50:y:2021:i:1:p:261-280
    DOI: 10.1111/fima.12326
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    Cited by:

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    3. Luo, Danglun & Piao, Zhirong & Wu, Cen & Zhang, Frank Feida, 2024. "Collateral damage: Evidence from share pledging in China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    4. Qiu, Yong & Guo, Ziyang & Li, Junlong & Li, Biao & Qiao, Dan, 2024. "Impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledges on firms’ labour investment efficiency," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    5. Wang, Mingwei & Zhang, Junping & Liang, Decui, 2024. "Multi-period share pledging with sequential three-way proportion decision," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    6. Jose, Amal & Bhaduri, Saumitra, 2024. "Promoter's share pledging and investment–The role of financial constraints," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(PA).
    7. Singh, Amanjot & Singh, Harminder, 2022. "Insiders' stock pledging disclosures and credit ratings: Evidence from India," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    8. Gosain, Neha & Kashiramka, Smita & Chaudhry, Neeru, 2025. "Signaling vs. agency theory: What drives dividends of promoter-owned firms during a crisis?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(PA).
    9. Liu, Wei & Tian, Gary Gang, 2022. "Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(6).
    10. Kousik Ganguly & Ajay Kumar Mishra, 2024. "Does Bankruptcy Reforms Enhance Firm Performances for Politically Connected Firms? Evidence from India," Journal of Emerging Market Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research, vol. 23(2), pages 170-196, June.

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