Mutual Fund Incentive Fees: Determinants and Effects
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-053X.2010.01076.x
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"The Costs and Benefits of Performance Fees in Mutual Funds,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
- Servaes, Henri & Sigurdsson, Kari, 2018. "The costs and benefits of performance fees in mutual funds," CEPR Discussion Papers 13399, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Yaping Xiao & Haishu Qiao & Ting Xie, 2019. "Open-End Funds for Sustainable Economic Growth in China: The Relationship between Load Fees, Performance, and Flows," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(22), pages 1-27, November.
- Amparo Soler-Domínguez & Juan Carlos Matallín-Sáez & Diego Víctor de Mingo-López & Emili Tortosa-Ausina, 2020. "Social responsible mutual funds and lowcarbon economy," Working Papers 2020/15, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
- Marco Navone & Giacomo Nocera, 2016.
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- Marco Navone & Giacomo Nocera, 2016. "Unbundling the Expense Ratio: Hidden Distribution Costs in European Mutual Fund Markets," Post-Print hal-01366161, HAL.
- Mauro Mastrogiacomo & Yue Li & Rik Dillingh, 2022. "The displacement effect of compulsory pension savings on private savings. Evidence from the Netherlands, using pension funds supervisory data," Working Papers 474, DNB.
- Broeders, Dirk W.G.A. & van Oord, Arco & Rijsbergen, David R., 2019.
"Does it pay to pay performance fees? Empirical evidence from Dutch pension funds,"
Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 299-312.
- Dirk Broeders & Arco van Oord & David Rijsbergen, 2017. "Does it pay to pay performance fees? Empirical evidence from Dutch pension funds," DNB Working Papers 561, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Hafinaz Hasniyanti Hassan, 2018. "Conceptual Framework for the Determinants of Mutual Fund Performance in Malaysia," GATR Journals jfbr146, Global Academy of Training and Research (GATR) Enterprise.
- Amparo Soler‐Domínguez & Juan Carlos Matallín‐Sáez & Diego Víctor de Mingo‐López & Emili Tortosa‐Ausina, 2021. "Looking for sustainable development: Socially responsible mutual funds and the low‐carbon economy," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 1751-1766, May.
- Amaral, Fatima & Reis, Pedro & Pinto, Pedro, 2019. "Evaluating investment fund performance in Portugal," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center (PRADEC), vol. 15(2).
- Sandro Casal & Matteo Ploner & Alec N. Sproten, 2019.
"Fostering The Best Execution Regime: An Experiment About Pecuniary Sanctions And Accountability In Fiduciary Money Management,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 600-616, January.
- Casal, Sandro & Ploner, Matteo & Sproten, Alec N., 2014. "Fostering the best execution regime: An experiment about pecuniary sanctions and accountability in fiduciary money management," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 13/2014, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
- Sproten, Alec & Casal, Sandro & Ploner, Matteo, 2016. "Fostering the Best Execution Regime An Experiment about Pecuniary Sanctions and Accountability in Fiduciary Money Management," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145871, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Broeders, Dirk W.G.A. & van Oord, Arco & Rijsbergen, David R., 2016. "Scale economies in pension fund investments: A dissection of investment costs across asset classes," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 147-171.
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