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Asymmetric contracts, cash flows and risk taking of mutual funds

Author

Listed:
  • Sheng, Jiliang
  • Wang, Jian
  • Wang, Xiaoting
  • Yang, Jun

Abstract

Fund managers in delegated portfolio management face asymmetries in their compensation contracts and in the fund flows contingent on their funds' performance relative to a benchmark. In this study we investigate the impacts of contract asymmetry and fund flow asymmetry on the risk-taking behavior of open-end funds whose delegation contracts are performance based, and show that their impacts are opposite. When the two asymmetries apply simultaneously, the impact of one on the fund's risk-taking alleviates the impact of the other. Raising the return-sharing ratio cannot make the manager take more risk, but increasing the cash flow volume can. We also show that the tracking-error variance can measure the degree of risk that the fund takes.

Suggested Citation

  • Sheng, Jiliang & Wang, Jian & Wang, Xiaoting & Yang, Jun, 2014. "Asymmetric contracts, cash flows and risk taking of mutual funds," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 435-442.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:38:y:2014:i:c:p:435-442
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.01.024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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