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Chronicles of a democracy postponed : Cultural legacy of the Russian transition

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  • Elena Gaber
  • Leonid Polishchuk
  • Kharis Sokolov
  • Denis Stukal

Abstract

We explain a lack of civic culture in today's Russia, closely related to a democratic deficit in the country, by a path dependency which has originated at the critical juncture of transition to market economy. Suppression of democracy in the early 1990s to expedite unpopular reform exposed the new institutional order to oligarchic capture and set in motion a vicious circle of extractive economic and political institutions. The latter have been shaping views and attitudes in the society via institutional learning, continuously suppressing civic culture and solidifying social foundations for extractive institutions. We present evidence from the World Values Survey supporting the above conclusions.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Gaber & Leonid Polishchuk & Kharis Sokolov & Denis Stukal, 2019. "Chronicles of a democracy postponed : Cultural legacy of the Russian transition," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 27(1), pages 99-137, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:27:y:2019:i:1:p:99-137
    DOI: 10.1111/ecot.12207
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Michael Alexeev & Shlomo Weber, 2013. "Russian economy, the," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Shiller, Robert J & Boycko, Maxim & Korobov, Vladimir, 1991. "Popular Attitudes toward Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States Compared," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 385-400, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Natkhov, Timur & Pyle, William, 2023. "Revealed in transition: The political effect of planning's legacy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    2. repec:zbw:bofitp:2020_017 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. William Pyle, 2021. "Russia’s “impressionable years”: life experience during the exit from communism and Putin-era beliefs," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(1), pages 1-25, January.

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