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Fixed‐price contracts, learning, and outsourcing: explaining the continuous growth of output and labour productivity in the German aircraft industry during the Second World War1

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  • LUTZ BUDRASS
  • JONAS SCHERNER
  • JOCHEN STREB

Abstract

In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm‐level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especially high in the early phase of the war, and secondly, that the regulatory setting of aircraft production management was rather constant and was not dramatically changed after 1941. In addition, we demonstrate that the driving forces of productivity growth were primarily learning‐by‐doing and outsourcing, the latter being generally neglected by economic historians.

Suggested Citation

  • Lutz Budrass & Jonas Scherner & Jochen Streb, 2010. "Fixed‐price contracts, learning, and outsourcing: explaining the continuous growth of output and labour productivity in the German aircraft industry during the Second World War1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 63(1), pages 107-136, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:63:y:2010:i:1:p:107-136
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2009.00471.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jochen Streb, 2009. "Negotiating contract types and contract clauses in the German construction industry during the Third Reich," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 364-379, June.
    2. Streb Jochen, 2003. "Das Scheitern der staatlichen Preisregulierung in der nationalsozialistischen Bauwirtschaft'," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook, De Gruyter, vol. 44(1), pages 27-48, June.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    4. Buchheim, Christoph & Scherner, Jonas, 2006. "The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 390-416, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tetsuji Okazaki, 2022. "Controlling Funds Allocation for the War: The Experience of Japan in the Late 1930s," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1191, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Tetsuji OKAZAKI, 2022. "Controlling Funds Allocation for the War: The Experience of Japan in the Late 1930s," CIGS Working Paper Series 22-005E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
    3. Tetsuji OKAZAKI, 2022. "Designing wartime economic controls: Productivity and firm dynamics in the Japanese cotton spinning industry, 1937–1939," CIGS Working Paper Series 22-002E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
    4. Cristiano Andrea Ristuccia & Adam Tooze, 2013. "Machine tools and mass production in the armaments boom: Germany and the United States, 1929–44," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 66(4), pages 953-974, November.
    5. Tetsuji Okazaki, 2022. "``Designing Wartime Economic Controls: Productivity and Firm Dynamics in the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry, 1937-1939''," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1187, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

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