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The organization of the grain trade in the early Roman Empire

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  • DAVID KESSLER
  • PETER TEMIN

Abstract

Rome was an exceedingly large city at the start of the Roman Empire, and it required massive grain imports to feed its population. We argue that Roman merchants organized these imports and that they used a variety of mechanisms to deal with the informational problems of long‐distance trade at that time. They used general institutions of Rome, such as its legal and social structures, as well as specific mercantile institutions, such as contracts, companies, and invoices. They exploited information in the Roman social structure as well as in the facilities for trade. This combination of social and economic institutions enabled Roman merchants to operate on as large a scale as any other pre‐industrial merchant group.

Suggested Citation

  • David Kessler & Peter Temin, 2007. "The organization of the grain trade in the early Roman Empire," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 60(2), pages 313-332, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:60:y:2007:i:2:p:313-332
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2006.00360.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, 2008. "Legal Institutions and Financial Development," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 11, pages 251-278, Springer.
    2. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2004. "Legal Regime and Business's Organizational Choice: A Comparison of France and the United States," NBER Working Papers 10288, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2004. "Legal Regime and Business’s Organizational Choice: A Comparison of France and the United States during the Mid-Nineteenth Century. Joint with Naomi Lamoreaux," UCLA Economics Online Papers 309, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arruñada, Benito, 2016. "How Rome enabled impersonal markets," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 68-84.
    2. Maristella Botticini & Pietro Buri & Massimo Marinacci, 2023. "Presidential Address 2023: The Beauty of Uncertainty: The Rise of Insurance Contracts and Markets in Medieval Europe," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(6), pages 2287-2326.
    3. Gary M. Pecquet, 2017. "The Original Road to Serfdom: From Rome to Feudal Europe," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 32(Spring 20), pages 45-62.
    4. Poitras, Geoffrey & Geranio, Manuela, 2016. "Trading of shares in the Societates Publicanorum?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 95-118.
    5. François Velde, 2014. "A Review of Peter Temin's The Roman Market Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1151-1159, December.
    6. John Hartwick, 2013. "Mining Gold For The Currency During The Pax Romana," Working Paper 1313, Economics Department, Queen's University.

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