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Politics With And Without Policy†

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  • Michelle R. Garfinkel
  • Amihai Glazer

Abstract

When strategic complementarities lead to the existence of multiple equilibria, a change in control of government may lead to changes in economic behavior by consumers or firms even if the different parties pursue the same policies. The existence of multiple equilibria, however, is not necessary to predict partisan effects. Furthermore, electoral uncertainty is not necessary to generate partisan effects; indeed, such uncertainty can dampen the cycle.

Suggested Citation

  • Michelle R. Garfinkel & Amihai Glazer, 1996. "Politics With And Without Policy†," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 251-265, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:8:y:1996:i:3:p:251-265
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1996.tb00131.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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