IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecopol/v26y2014i2p212-236.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Lobbying for Education in a Two-Sector Model

Author

Listed:
  • Debora Di Gioacchino
  • Paola Profeta

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="ecpo12031-abs-0001"> Firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and the education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the social planner. However, if lobbying is costly and there is sufficient asymmetry between the sectors, only one sector will exert pressure on the policy-maker in the attempt to direct resources toward the type of education required by its production. Which sector will engage in lobbying depends on relative size, productivity, and price. We also provide some preliminary evidence that lobbying activity by firms may influence the production of skills needed by those firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Debora Di Gioacchino & Paola Profeta, 2014. "Lobbying for Education in a Two-Sector Model," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 212-236, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:26:y:2014:i:2:p:212-236
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecpo.2014.26.issue-2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 2004. "The evolution of modern educational systems: Technical vs. general education, distributional conflict, and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 559-582, April.
    3. Di Gioacchino, Debora & Sabani, Laura, 2009. "Education policy and inequality: A political economy approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 463-478, December.
    4. Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Endogenous Lobbying," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 180-215, March.
    5. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    6. Daron Acemoglu, 2002. "Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(1), pages 7-72, March.
    7. Oded Galor & Omer Moav, 2000. "Das Human Kapital," Working Papers 2000-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    8. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    9. Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 1, pages 3-21, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. Dirk Krueger & Krishna B. Kumar, 2004. "Skill-Specific rather than General Education: A Reason for US--Europe Growth Differences?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 167-207, June.
    11. Debora Di Gioacchino & Paola Profeta, 2014. "Lobbying for Education in a Two-Sector Model," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 212-236, July.
    12. Alstadsæter, Annette & Kolm, Anne-Sofie & Larsen, Birthe, 2005. "Money or Joy," Working Papers 23-2005, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    13. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Oded Galor & Omer Moav, 2006. "Das Human-Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(1), pages 85-117.
    15. Jérôme Vandenbussche & Philippe Aghion & Costas Meghir, 2006. "Growth, distance to frontier and composition of human capital," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 97-127, June.
    16. Alstadsí¦ter, Annette & Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Larsen, Birthe, 2008. "Money or joy: The choice of educational type," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-122, March.
    17. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Debora Di Gioacchino & Paola Profeta, 2014. "Lobbying for Education in a Two-Sector Model," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 212-236, July.
    2. Ivo Bischoff & Julia Hauschildt, 2017. "Vocational Schools as an Instrument of Interregional Competition – Empirical Evidence from German Counties," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201722, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    3. Debora Di Gioacchino & Alina Verashchagina, 2017. "Mass media and attitudes to inequality," Working Papers in Public Economics 178, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    4. Debora Di Gioacchino & Laura Sabani & Simone Tedeschi, 2016. "Differences in education systems across OECD countries: the role ofeducation policy preferences in a hierarchical system," Working Papers in Public Economics 177, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    5. Richard Cothren & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2018. "Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 277-298, April.
    6. Ivo Bischoff & Julia Hauschildt, 2019. "Vocational schools as an instrument of interregional competition—Empirical evidence from German counties [Berufsschulen als Instrument im interregionalen Wettbewerb – Ergebnisse einer Analyse für d," Review of Regional Research: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer;Gesellschaft für Regionalforschung (GfR), vol. 39(1), pages 65-89, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. William Pyle & Laura Solanko, 2013. "The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 19-41, April.
    2. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," Working Papers 2072/151545, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    3. Jean-Luc Demeulemeester & Claude Diebolt, 2011. "Education and Growth: What Links for Which Policy?," Historical Social Research (Section 'Cliometrics'), Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 36(4), pages 323-346.
    4. Zudenkova Galina, 2017. "Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-17, January.
    5. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Pyle, William & Solanko, Laura, 2010. "The composition and interests of Russia's business lobbies: A test of Olson's "encompassing organization" hypothesis," BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2010, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    7. Pyle, William & Solanko, Laura, 2010. "The composition and interests of Russia's business lobbies : A test of Olson's "encompassing organization" hypothesis," BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2010, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    8. Börner, Kira, 2004. "Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines," Discussion Papers in Economics 313, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    9. repec:zbw:bofitp:2010_005 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2010. "Businessman Candidates," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 718-736, July.
    11. Kui-Wai Li & Tung Liu & Lihong Yun, 2007. "Technology Progress, Efficiency, and Scale of Economy in Post-reform China," Working Papers 200701, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007.
    12. Bert Minne & Marc van der Steeg & Dinand Webbink, 2008. "Skill gaps in the EU: role for education and training policies," CPB Document 162, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    13. Oded Galor & Omer Moav, 2004. "From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation: Inequality and the Process of Development," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(4), pages 1001-1026.
    14. Eric A. Hanushek & Guido Schwerdt & Ludger Woessmann & Lei Zhang, 2017. "General Education, Vocational Education, and Labor-Market Outcomes over the Lifecycle," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 52(1), pages 48-87.
    15. Masahiro Endoh, 2012. "Cross-border political donations and Pareto-efficient tariffs," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 493-512, July.
    16. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2009. "Campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-391, April.
    17. Grossman, Gene, 2016. "The Purpose of Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 11151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    19. Gawande, Kishore & Krishna, Pravin & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2009. "What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 491-532, July.
    20. Matsueda, Norimichi, 2020. "Collective vs. individual lobbying," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    21. Giovanni Facchini, 2004. "The political economy of international trade and factor mobility," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 1-32, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:26:y:2014:i:2:p:212-236. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.