IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecopol/v19y2007i2p259-287.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Rational Choice Explanation For Stalin'S “Great Terror”

Author

Listed:
  • VAHE LSKAVYAN

Abstract

There is no agreement about the reasons for Stalin's Great Terror of 1937–1939. This paper argues that the problem faced by Stalin was similar to the standard principal–agent problem: the country was run as one enormous firm with Stalin as the only residual claimant. The monetary incentive structure was inadequate and the threat of mass shirking by the agents was real. A simple model of a principal with two agents is developed to address the problem. Assuming that the agents can observe and can reveal each other's shirking, it is shown that, under some assumptions, an equilibrium exists with the following strategy profiles: unless someone's shirking is revealed, the principal is committed to randomly punishing one of the agents with positive probability; an individual agent never shirks and always reveals a co‐worker's shirking. A case study of the period is used to check the plausibility of this hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Vahe Lskavyan, 2007. "A Rational Choice Explanation For Stalin'S “Great Terror”," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 259-287, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:19:y:2007:i:2:p:259-287
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00311.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00311.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00311.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gregory,Paul R., 2003. "The Political Economy of Stalinism," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521533676, October.
    2. Gregory,Paul R., 2003. "The Political Economy of Stalinism," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521826280, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kimberly R Frugé, 2019. "Repressive agent defections: How power, costs, and uncertainty influence military behavior and state repression," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(6), pages 591-607, November.
    2. Nikolova, Milena & Popova, Olga & Otrachshenko, Vladimir, 2022. "Stalin and the origins of mistrust," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    3. Yuri M. Zhukov, 2013. "An Epidemic Model of Violence and Public Support in Civil War," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(1), pages 24-52, February.
    4. Jan Henryk Pierskalla, 2010. "Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(1), pages 117-145, February.
    5. Yuri M. Zhukov, 2014. "Theory of Indiscriminate Violence," Working Paper 365551, Harvard University OpenScholar.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Markevich, Andrei & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2011. "M-form hierarchy with poorly-diversified divisions: A case of Khrushchev's reform in Soviet Russia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1550-1560.
    2. Valery Lazarev, 2004. "Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime," Working Papers 882, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    3. Andrei Markevich & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2009. "Career Concerns in a Political Hierarchy: A Case of Regional Leaders in Soviet Russia," Working Papers w0040, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:19:y:2007:i:2:p:259-287. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.