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Fiscal Constraints, Collection Costs, And Trade Policies

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  • Keiko Kubota

Abstract

The last two decades witnessed trade liberalization in many developing countries. What caused this trend, and why have trade barriers been so ubiquitous when economic theory overwhelmingly supports free trade? This paper proposes that governments' revenue needs are the driving force. Governments may rely disproportionately on trade taxes because they are inexpensive to collect. Trade liberalization is an integral part of a tax reform: a tax base expansion is necessary to allow governments to reduce tariff rates. This hypothesis is supported by a panel data analysis of 27 developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Keiko Kubota, 2005. "Fiscal Constraints, Collection Costs, And Trade Policies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 129-150, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i:1:p:129-150
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2005.00149.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Grabowski, 2010. "A comparison of Latin American and African economic development with an East Asian twist," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 24(2), pages 104-116, November.
    2. Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, 2008. "Reconsidering the empirical evidence on the Grossman-Helpman model of endogenous protection," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(2), pages 501-516, May.
    3. Matschke, Xenia, 2008. "Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 143-157, January.
    4. Antonis Adam, 2009. "Fiscal Reliance on Tariff Revenues: In Search of a Political Economy Explanation?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 610-625, November.
    5. Ahmad, Khalil & Ali, Safdar & Ali, Amjad, 2018. "Trade Revenue Implications of Trade Liberalization in Pakistan," MPRA Paper 87529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Abel Escribà-Folch, 2009. "Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 71-93, March.
    7. Bussmann, Margit, 2009. "The Effect of Trade Openness on Women's Welfare and Work Life," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1027-1038, June.

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