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Was Mancur a Maoist? An Essay on Kleptocracy and Political Stability

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  • Susan Rose‐Ackerman

Abstract

Much of Mancur Olson's work explored the link between government structure and economic development. This paper provides a framework for thinking about this link that exposes both the powerful insights and the deep tensions in Olson's work. In The Rise and Decline of Nations Olson argued that instability was good for democratic accountability because it upset entrenched interests. In contrast, after the fall of the socialist regimes in Europe and the Soviet Union, Olson argued that the stability of a single autocrat or “stationary bandit” was superior to the competitive rent seeking of competing “roving bandits.” I argue that there is a real inconsistency in Olson's thinking on the role of stability and change in political life; I do this by developing the connections between Olson's classic Logic of Collective Action and his subsequent writing. The paper concludes by building on Olson's insights to point the way to a more complete analysis of democracy and transition.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan Rose‐Ackerman, 2003. "Was Mancur a Maoist? An Essay on Kleptocracy and Political Stability," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 163-180, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:163-180
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00120
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
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    Cited by:

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    4. Rui Tang & Shiping Tang, 2018. "Democracy's Unique Advantage in Promoting Economic Growth: Quantitative Evidence for a New Institutional Theory," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(4), pages 642-666, November.

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