An Experimental Examination Of Fisheries With Concurrent Common Pool And Individual Quota Management
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- World Bank & Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009. "The Sunken Billions : The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2596.
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Cited by:
- Klis, Anna A. & Melstrom, Richard T., 2020. "Strategic behavior and dynamic externalities in commercial fisheries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
- Wakamatsu, Mihoko & Anderson, Christopher M., 2018. "The Endogenous Evolution of Common Property Management Systems," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 211-217.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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