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Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Matter For Monetary Policy?

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  • STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI
  • LIANFA LI

Abstract

Central bankers and financial supervisors can have conflicting goals. While monetary policymakers work to ensure sufficient lending activities as a foundation for high and stable economic growth, supervisors may limit banks’ lending capacities in order to prevent excessive risk taking. We show that, in theory, central bankers can avoid this potential conflict by adopting an interest rate strategy that takes accounts of capital adequacy requirements. Empirical evidence suggests that while policymakers at the Federal Reserve have adjusted their interest rate to neutralizing the procyclical impact of bank capital requirements, those in Germany and Japan have not. (JEL E52, E58, G21)

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen G. Cecchetti & Lianfa Li, 2008. "Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Matter For Monetary Policy?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(4), pages 643-659, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:46:y:2008:i:4:p:643-659
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00085.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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