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Not following the script: When institutional development is uneven

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  • Ryan H Murphy

Abstract

Three characteristics of developed twenty‐first century countries are high levels of state capacity, democracy, and economic freedom. This article compares countries that lack one of the characteristics with countries that have more even levels of institutional development. Countries which lack democracy use other means to secure political legitimacy, and those without strong states are geographically concentrated in Latin America and eastern Europe. Those without liberalised economic institutions are an idiosyncratic group that have unconventional historical paths. These findings speak to the prospects for development outside the liberal democratic path, the nature of development in the absence of a state, and unexplored determinants of economic freedom.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan H Murphy, 2024. "Not following the script: When institutional development is uneven," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 338-352, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:44:y:2024:i:2:p:338-352
    DOI: 10.1111/ecaf.12650
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    References listed on IDEAS

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