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The case for 100% money: Ten reasons for separating money issuance from banking

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  • Samuel Demeulemeester

Abstract

The ‘100% money’ proposal aims at divorcing the creation of money from banking, by requiring 100% reserves on transaction accounts. The public monetary authority would then be the sole issuer of means of payment, while the banks would function as true intermediaries, financing loans with pre‐existing money. This article, building on the works of 1930s economists such as Irving Fisher, presents ten arguments in favour of this reform proposal — arguing that it would, in particular, prevent cumulative variations in the money stock, facilitate monetary control, reduce government intervention in banking, improve public finances, and make money creation more neutral.

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  • Samuel Demeulemeester, 2024. "The case for 100% money: Ten reasons for separating money issuance from banking," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 57-70, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:44:y:2024:i:1:p:57-70
    DOI: 10.1111/ecaf.12614
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Samuel Demeulemeester, 2022. "Divorcing money creation from bank loans: revisiting the “100% money” proposal of the 1930s [Dissocier la création monétaire des prêts bancaires : retour sur la proposition "100% monnaie"," Post-Print hal-03938669, HAL.
    2. Baeriswyl Romain & Cornand Camille, 2018. "The distortionary effect of monetary policy: credit expansion vs. lump-sum transfers in the lab," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-30, June.
    3. Samuel Demeulemeester, 2018. "The 100% money proposal and its implications for banking: the Currie–Fisher approach versus the Chicago Plan approach," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 357-387, March.
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    5. Samuel Demeulemeester, 2021. "The 100% money proposal of the 1930s: an avatar of the Currency School’s reform ideas?," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 577-598, July.
    6. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    7. Adair Turner, 2015. "Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10546.
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