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Governing Emerging Stock Markets: legal vs administrative governance

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  • Katharina Pistor
  • Chenggang Xu

Abstract

Transition economies face a fundamental dilemma. They need to develop financial markets, and yet they lack the ingredients it takes to do so. Recipes for legal governance mechanisms that have worked elsewhere, including reactive law enforcement by courts and proactive law enforcement by regulators, may not help in the short to medium term. Using evidence from stock market development in China and Russia, this paper suggests that at least in the short term, administrative governance may be a viable alternative to legal governance in emerging stock markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, 2005. "Governing Emerging Stock Markets: legal vs administrative governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 5-10, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:13:y:2005:i:1:p:5-10
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00398.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, 1993. "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2), pages 1-74.
    2. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung & Wayne Yu, 1999. "The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1879, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    3. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ola Nilsson, 2018. "The relationship between shareholder protection through regulation and the demand for external auditor services," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(3), pages 162-175, August.
    2. Andreas Heinrich & Aleksandra Lis & Heiko Pleines, 2007. "Factors Influencing Corporate Governance in post-Socialist Companies: an Analytical Framework," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp896, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    3. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Jiang, Ping & LIMPAPHAYOM, Piman & Lu, Tong, 2008. "Does corporate governance matter in China?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 460-479, September.
    4. Gao, Lei & Kling, Gerhard, 2012. "The impact of corporate governance and external audit on compliance to mandatory disclosure requirements in China," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 17-31.
    5. Yao, Youfu & Hong, Yun, 2023. "Can comment letters impact excess cash holdings? Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 900-922.
    6. Shujun Ding & Zhenyu Wu & Yuanshun Li & Chunxin Jia, 2009. "Can the Chinese Two-Tier-Board system Control the Board Chair Pay?," Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting, Macrothink Institute, vol. 1(1), pages 122-122, December.
    7. Wang, Boya, 2018. "Ownership, institutions and firm value: Cross-provincial evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 547-565.
    8. Donghua Chen & Tiesheng Zhang & Xiang Li, 2008. "Law environment, government regulation and implicit contract: Empirical evidence from the scandals of China’s listed companies," Psychometrika, Springer;The Psychometric Society, vol. 3(4), pages 560-584, December.
    9. Pompeu Casanovas & Louis de Koker & Mustafa Hashmi, 2022. "Law, Socio-Legal Governance, the Internet of Things, and Industry 4.0: A Middle-Out/Inside-Out Approach," J, MDPI, vol. 5(1), pages 1-28, January.
    10. Boya Wang, 2016. "Ownership, Institutions & Firm Value: Cross-Provincial Evidence from China," Working Papers wp484, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    11. Hong, Yun & Yao, Youfu, 2024. "Can comment letters impact excess perks? Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).

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