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Ben Bernanke And The Zero Bound

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  • Laurence Ball

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="coep12103-abs-0001"> From 2000 to 2003, when Ben Bernanke was a professor and then a Fed Governor, he wrote extensively about monetary policy at the zero bound on interest rates. He advocated aggressive stimulus policies, such as a money-financed tax cut and an inflation target of 3%–4%. Yet, after U.S. interest rates hit zero in 2008, the Fed under Chairman Bernanke took more cautious actions. This paper asks when and why Bernanke changed his mind about zero-bound policy. The answer, at one level, is that he was influenced by analysis from the Fed staff that was presented at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of June 2003. This answer raises another question: why did the staff's views influence Bernanke so strongly? I seek answers to this question in the social psychology literature on group decision-making. (JEL E52, E58)

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence Ball, 2016. "Ben Bernanke And The Zero Bound," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(1), pages 7-20, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:34:y:2016:i:1:p:7-20
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/coep.2016.34.issue-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Bank of Japan at the Policy Frontier
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2016-10-31 17:38:58

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    Cited by:

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    2. Salter, Alexander W. & Smith, Daniel J., 2019. "Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    3. Roland Bénabou, 2013. "Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 429-462.
    4. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 173-190.
    5. Kazuo Ueda, 2012. "Deleveraging and Monetary Policy: Japan since the 1990s and the United States since 2007," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 177-202, Summer.
    6. N. Cordemans & S. Ide, 2012. "Monetary policy in the United States and the euro area during the crisis," Economic Review, National Bank of Belgium, issue i, pages 39-63, June.
    7. Peter J. Boettke & Alexander W. Salter & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "Money as meta-rule: Buchanan’s constitutional economics as a foundation for monetary stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 529-555, September.
    8. John H. Cochrane, 2017. "Michelson-Morley, Fisher, and Occam: The Radical Implications of Stable Quiet Inflation at the Zero Bound," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2017, volume 32, pages 113-226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Saito, Yuta, 2024. "Expectations for the MPC chair and interest rate persistence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 25-30.
    10. Jakub Janus, 2013. "Wpływ doświadczeń Banku Japonii na politykę pieniężną Systemu Rezerwy Federalnej w latach 2007-2011," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1-2, pages 71-90.
    11. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2015. "Monetary Policy Committees: Comparing Theory and "Inside" Information from MPC Members," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 47-89, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

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