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Who Bears The Burden Of U.S. Nontariff Measures?

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  • DON P. CLARK
  • DONALD BRUCE

Abstract

This article provides evidence on the incidence of U.S. nontariff measures (NTMs) by investigating the relationship between per capita income and various indicators of NTM use. Collectively, NTMs are found to bear heavily on products of export interest to the poorer countries. Antidumping duty actions and voluntary export restraint agreements primarily target newly industrializing and industrial nations in the middle third of the income scale. The overall protection pattern suggests poorer countries will find it difficult to escape NTMs by attaining higher levels of economic development. Results also provide insight into country and industry‐level determinants of NTM use. (JEL F0, F1)

Suggested Citation

  • Don P. Clark & Donald Bruce, 2006. "Who Bears The Burden Of U.S. Nontariff Measures?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(2), pages 274-286, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:24:y:2006:i:2:p:274-286
    DOI: 10.1093/cep/byj001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Chang & Lin, Dongtao & Liu, Jiawei & Li, Yanran, 2019. "Quantifying the effects of non-tariff measures on African agri-food exporters," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 58(4), April.
    2. Morkre, Morris & Spinanger, Dean & Tran, Lien, 2008. "Are unfair import laws unfair to developing countries: evidence from US antidumping actions 1990 - 2004," Kiel Working Papers 1438, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Salamat Ali, 2016. "Export Response to Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade: Firm-level Evidence from a Developing Country," Discussion Papers 2016-02, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade

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