IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/coecpo/v20y2002i4p479-489.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Endogenous Protection In A Trade Liberalizing Economy: The Case Of South Africa

Author

Listed:
  • Merle Holden
  • Daniela Casale

Abstract

This article aims to establish the changes that occurred in the institutional structures governing trade policy in South Africa during the period 1990–1998. It also examines the forces that influenced the application of tariff policy by the major tariff‐setting bodies by applying various theories of endogenous protection to their decisions. Using firm‐level data on applications made to the Board on Tariffs and Trade, the study finds that when estimating a probit model, employment considerations rather than capital invested influenced the board's decisions to grant protection. In addition, the board is found to have granted protection even in the face of tariff lines having been bound under the Uruguay Round. The article argues that this should not be interpreted as a reversal of the trade liberalization but rather as an attempt by the board to cushion firms from the acceleration in the tariff rationalization process that occurred after the GATT offer. Finally, it is suggested that the board's response to changes in import penetration ratios between industries that were considered organized provides prima facie evidence of the superior lobbying ability of such industries.

Suggested Citation

  • Merle Holden & Daniela Casale, 2002. "Endogenous Protection In A Trade Liberalizing Economy: The Case Of South Africa," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(4), pages 479-489, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:20:y:2002:i:4:p:479-489
    DOI: 10.1093/cep/20.4.479
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/cep/20.4.479
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1093/cep/20.4.479?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. repec:bla:ecorec:v:56:y:1980:i:153:p:132-44 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Ronald S. Saunders, 1980. "The Political Economy of Effective Tariff Protection in Canada's Manufacturing Sector," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(2), pages 340-348, May.
    4. Kym Anderson, 1980. "The Political Market for Government Assistance to Australian Manufacturing Industries," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 56(153), pages 132-144, June.
    5. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Merle Holden, 2001. "Trade policy in a liberalizing economy," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(6), pages 711-723.
    2. Lawrence Edwards & Robert Lawrence, 2008. "SACU Tariff Policies: Where Should They Go From Here?," CID Working Papers 169, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    3. Chad P. Bown, 2011. "The Great Recession and Import Protection : The Role of Temporary Trade Barriers," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 16359.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Francois, Joseph & Nelson, Douglas & Pelkmans-Balaoing, Annette, 2008. "Endogenous Protection in General Equilibrium: Estimating Political Weights in the EU," CEPR Discussion Papers 6979, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Costenot, Arnaud, 2006. "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: A New Perspective on Protectionism," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt1bt8n04n, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    3. Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2009. "Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 50299, World Bank.
    4. Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "What does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That We Ought to Know?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1039, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Arnaud Costinot, 2009. "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: A "New" Perspective on Protectionism," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(5), pages 1011-1041, September.
    6. Christis G. Tombazos, 2003. "Unprotective Tariffs, Ineffective Liberalization, and Other Mysteries: An Investigation of the Endogenous Dimensions of Trade Policy Formation in Australia," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(1), pages 49-74, July.
    7. Lopez, Rigoberto A. & Hathie, Ibrahima, 2002. "Testing Protection For Sale In The Food Industries," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19682, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Alexander, Patrick D. & Keay, Ian, 2019. "Responding to the First Era of Globalization: Canadian Trade Policy, 1870–1913," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 826-861, September.
    9. Lopez, Rigoberto A. & Hathie, Ibrahima, 2002. "Is Protection for Sale in U.S. Food Industries?," Research Reports 25182, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
    10. Maggi, Giovanni & Rodriguez-Clare, Andres, 2000. "Import penetration and the politics of trade protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 287-304, August.
    11. Joseph S Shapiro, 2021. "The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(2), pages 831-886.
    12. Bin, Sheng, 2000. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China," Working Papers 10/2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy.
    13. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 195-230.
    14. Nadine Riedel & Martin Simmler, 2018. "Large and Influential: Firm Size and Governments' Corporate Tax Rate Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series 6904, CESifo.
    15. Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Nina Pavcnik, 2001. "Trade Protection and Wages: Evidence from the Colombian Trade Reforms," NBER Working Papers 8575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 2001. "Political economy, sectoral shocks, and border enforcement," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(3), pages 612-638, August.
    17. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Max F. Steinhardt & Maurizio Zanardi, 2020. "The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 250-278, July.
    18. Giovanni Facchini & Johannes Van Biesebroeck & Gerald Willmann, 2006. "Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 845-873, August.
    19. Zissimos, Ben, 2009. "Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 276-286, July.
    20. Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Maria Petrova & Ruben Enikolopov, 2008. "The Dracula effect: voter information and trade policy," Economics Working Papers 1296, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2020.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:20:y:2002:i:4:p:479-489. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.