Do Hmos Encourage Prevention? An Analysis Of Alternative Health Care Plans
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DOI: 10.1093/cep/20.4.429
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Udo Schneider & Jürgen Zerth, 2011. "Improving Prevention Compliance through Appropriate Incentives: Theoretical Modelling and Empirical Evidence," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 147(I), pages 71-106, March.
- Schneider, Udo & Zerth, Jürgen, 2008. "Improving prevention compliance through appropriate incentives," MPRA Paper 8280, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yuriy Pylypchuk & Julie Hudson, 2009. "Immigrants and the use of preventive care in the United States," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(7), pages 783-806, July.
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