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Do Hmos Encourage Prevention? An Analysis Of Alternative Health Care Plans

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  • Thomas J. Miceli
  • Dennis Heffley

Abstract

We examine consumers' choice of preventive care and providers' choice of capacity (which affects the transaction costs of consuming health care) under alternative health care financing plans. We show that consumers choose Pareto‐optimal prevention and providers choose optimal capacity under a pure feE‐for‐service (FFS) plan and under a mixed plan that includes an up‐front fee and a fee for service. Under a pure prepaid plan, however, consumers may over‐ or underconsume prevention. In the former case, capacity restrictions under such a plan (e.g., long office waits, limited options) may be interpreted as a second‐best response to overconsumption. We also find that the dollar costs of health care are higher under the prepaid plan. These conclusions cast doubt on some of the presumed advantages of HMOs.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas J. Miceli & Dennis Heffley, 2002. "Do Hmos Encourage Prevention? An Analysis Of Alternative Health Care Plans," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(4), pages 429-439, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:20:y:2002:i:4:p:429-439
    DOI: 10.1093/cep/20.4.429
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Udo Schneider & Jürgen Zerth, 2011. "Improving Prevention Compliance through Appropriate Incentives: Theoretical Modelling and Empirical Evidence," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 147(I), pages 71-106, March.
    2. Schneider, Udo & Zerth, Jürgen, 2008. "Improving prevention compliance through appropriate incentives," MPRA Paper 8280, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Yuriy Pylypchuk & Julie Hudson, 2009. "Immigrants and the use of preventive care in the United States," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(7), pages 783-806, July.

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