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How Has Rural Tax Reform Affected Farmers and Local Governance in China?

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  • Ran Tao
  • Ping Qin

Abstract

Using nationally representative data, the present paper examines the impact of China's ongoing rural tax reform on farmers. The difficulties in further local governance restructuring are also discussed. It is argued that the issues associated with rural taxation and local governance in China result from inherent tension between an increasingly liberalized economic system and a still centralized political system. Although rural tax reform has helped to reduce farmers' tax burdens in the short term, the establishment of an effective local governance regime requires coordinated reforms to downsize local bureaucracy by providing social security for laid‐off cadres, to strengthen local accountability by granting higher local formal tax autonomy, and to promote meaningful participation by expanding local democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Ran Tao & Ping Qin, 2007. "How Has Rural Tax Reform Affected Farmers and Local Governance in China?," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 15(3), pages 19-32, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:chinae:v:15:y:2007:i:3:p:19-32
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-124X.2007.00066.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. World Bank, 2002. "China - National Development and Sub-National Finance : A Review of Provincial Expenditures," World Bank Publications - Reports 15423, The World Bank Group.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Xiaxin & Shen, Yan, 2014. "The effect of China's agricultural tax abolition on rural families' incomes and production," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 185-199.
    2. Gustafsson, Björn Anders & Zhang, Yudan, 2022. "Incomplete Catching Up: Income among Manchurian, Yi and Han People in Rural China from 2002 to 2018," IZA Discussion Papers 15219, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. James Alm & Yongzheng Liu, 2013. "Did China's Tax-for-Fee Reform Improve Farmers' Welfare in Rural Areas?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(4), pages 516-532, April.
    4. Lu, Jie, 2015. "Varieties of Governance in China: Migration and Institutional Change in Chinese Villages," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199378746.
    5. James Alm & Yongzheng Liu, 2014. "China's Tax-for-Fee Reform and Village Inequality," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(1), pages 38-64, March.
    6. Zhongen Niu & Huimin Yan & Fang Liu, 2020. "Decreasing Cropping Intensity Dominated the Negative Trend of Cropland Productivity in Southern China in 2000–2015," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(23), pages 1-14, December.

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