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An Empirical Analysis of the Relative Efficiency of Policy Instruments to Reduce Nitrate Water Pollution in the U.S. Southern High Plains

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  • JunJie Wu
  • Mark L. Teague
  • Harry P. Mapp
  • Daniel J. Bernardo

Abstract

This paper analyzes the costs and benefits of controlling groundwater pollution from agricultural use of nitrogen fertilizer in southwestern Ontario. The Village of Hensall, where nitrate concentrations have been observed above 10 mg/L in recent years, is selected as the study site.'The CREAMS simulation model is used to estimate the effect of reducing nitrogen fertilizer on nitrate leaching and consequently on nitrate groundwater pollution. Estimates of the value of groundwater are obtained from the literature and are used to calculate the off-farm cost of groundwater contamination. This procedure results in a wide range of values for the benefits of reducing nitrate pollution. Estimated annual benefits of improved ground-water quality range from less than $1,000 to more than $30,000 for the village. The off-farm benefits of nitrate groundwater pollution abatement outweigh the cost of using bottled water and also exceed the on-farm cost of reducing nitrogen fertilizer application rates. Placing a tax on nitrogen fertilizer would reduce the level of nitrogen applications, but the farm cost of compliance to a nitrogen tax policy is substantially higher than the compliance cost under a regulatory policy that imposes a quantitative ceiling on nitrogen application rates over the part of the aquifer from which the village draws its water supply.
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Suggested Citation

  • JunJie Wu & Mark L. Teague & Harry P. Mapp & Daniel J. Bernardo, 1995. "An Empirical Analysis of the Relative Efficiency of Policy Instruments to Reduce Nitrate Water Pollution in the U.S. Southern High Plains," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 43(3), pages 403-420, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:canjag:v:43:y:1995:i:3:p:403-420
    DOI: j.1744-7976.1995.tb00131.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Aftab, Ashar & Hanley, Nick & Baiocchi, Giovanni, 2010. "Integrated regulation of nonpoint pollution: Combining managerial controls and economic instruments under multiple environmental targets," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 24-33, November.
    2. Kampas, Athanasios, 2001. "Identifying Common Fallacies in the Choice of Environmental Taxes for Agricultural Pollution Control: The Absence of Transaction Costs and the Normality of Agricultural Pollutants," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 1-15, August.
    3. JunJie Wu & Bruce Babcock, 2001. "Spatial Heterogeneity and the Choice of Instruments to Control Nonpoint Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(2), pages 173-192, February.
    4. Ashar Aftab & Nick Hanley & Athanasios Kampas, 2007. "Co-ordinated environmental regulation: controlling non-point nitrate pollution while maintaining river flows," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(4), pages 573-593, December.
    5. Dan Protopopescu, 2009. "Dynamic Stackelberg Game with Risk-Averse Players: Optimal Risk-Sharing under Asymmetric Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 797.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Matekole, Augustus N. & Westra, John V. & Appelboom, Timothy W., 2009. "Best Management Practices: How Economical is it in Southern Agricultural Systems?," 2009 Annual Meeting, January 31-February 3, 2009, Atlanta, Georgia 46757, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    7. Segerson, Kathleen & Wu, JunJie, 2006. "Nonpoint pollution control: Inducing first-best outcomes through the use of threats," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 165-184, March.
    8. P. Bontems & N. Turpin & Gilles Rotillon, 2003. "Acceptibility constraints and self-selecting agri-environmental policies," THEMA Working Papers 2003-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    9. Philippe Bontems & Gilles Rotillon & Nadine Turpin, 2008. "Acceptable reforms of agri-environmental policies," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(6), pages 847-883.
    10. Athanasios Kampas & Ben White, 2004. "Administrative Costs and Instrument Choice for Stochastic Non-point Source Pollutants," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(2), pages 109-133, February.
    11. Kampas, Athanasios & White, Ben, 2003. "Probabilistic programming for nitrate pollution control: Comparing different probabilistic constraint approximations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 217-228, May.

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