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A Proposal to Extend Universal Insurance to Dental Care in Australia

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  • Philip Clarke
  • Henry Cutler

Abstract

The debate over universal dental insurance in Australia has persisted since the mid‐1970s, as dental care was excluded from Medibank (the predecessor of Medicare) for political and economic reasons. Importantly, dental care expenses are often more predictable than other types of medical care, making insurance design more challenging. We provide an overview of proposals for public dental insurance in Australia, arguing that income‐contingent loans to fund higher dental costs may provide a mechanism for expanding insurance while limiting government expenditure. Finally, we argue that a randomised controlled experiment could offer insights into the effectiveness and sustainability of various insurance models for dental care.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Clarke & Henry Cutler, 2024. "A Proposal to Extend Universal Insurance to Dental Care in Australia," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 57(2), pages 168-173, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ausecr:v:57:y:2024:i:2:p:168-173
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8462.12556
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
    2. Dubra, Juan, 2005. "Interview with Kenneth Arrow," MPRA Paper 967, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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