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Managing the Political Life Cycle of Regulation in the UK and German Telecommunication Sectors

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  • David Coen

Abstract

**: Economic regulators are accountable to politicians – both government and ministers – parallel regulatory authorities, such as cartel offices, consumers and regulatees. This article investigates how the relationship between regulators and stakeholders evolves as a function of market developments and political learning. Drawing on a comparative case study of the UK and German telecommunication sector, the paper illustrates how regulators constrained by administrative and business traditions have asserted their discretion over politicians by developing sophisticated political relationship with a wide range of stakeholders. The paper concludes that while regulators have undoubtedly diverged from the initial delegation of powers, there is little evidence to suggest that European regulators will converge on a single regulatory model.

Suggested Citation

  • David Coen, 2005. "Managing the Political Life Cycle of Regulation in the UK and German Telecommunication Sectors," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(1), pages 59-84, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:76:y:2005:i:1:p:59-84
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1370-4788.2005.00271.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baldwin, Robert & Cave, Martin & Lodge, Martin, 2011. "Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199576098, December.
    2. Paul Willman & David Coen & David Currie & Martin Siner, 2003. "The evolution of regulatory relationships; regulatory institutions and firm behaviour in privatized industries," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 12(1), pages 69-89, February.
    3. David Parker, 2004. "The UK's Privatisation Experiment: The Passage of Time Permits a Sober Assessment," CESifo Working Paper Series 1126, CESifo.
    4. Michael W. Bauer, 2005. "Administrative Costs of Reforming Utilities," Chapters, in: David Coen & Adrienne Héritier (ed.), Refining Regulatory Regimes, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Makkai, Toni & Braithwaite, John, 1992. "In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 61-78, January.
    6. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    7. Rainer Eising, 2000. "Bounded Rationality and Policy Learning in EU Negotiations: the Liberalization of the Electricity Supply Industry," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 26, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
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    Cited by:

    1. Dunnewijk, Theo & Hultén, Staffan, 2006. "A Brief History of Mobile Telecommunication in Europe," MERIT Working Papers 2006-034, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).

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