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Are Agricultural PACs Monolithic? An Empirical Investigation of Political Contributions from Agricultural Subsectors

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  • Craig A. Bond
  • Dana L. Hoag
  • Jennifer Freeborn

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  • Craig A. Bond & Dana L. Hoag & Jennifer Freeborn, 2011. "Are Agricultural PACs Monolithic? An Empirical Investigation of Political Contributions from Agricultural Subsectors," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 210-237, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:70:y:2011:i:1:p:210-237
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2010.00769.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ovchinnikova, Natalia V. & Czap, Hans J. & Lynne, Gary D. & Larimer, Christopher W., 2009. ""I don't want to be selling my soul": Two experiments in environmental economics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 221-229, March.
    2. Poole, Keith T & Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1987. "The Revealed Preferences of Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 298-302, May.
    3. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "Are Contributions Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 647-664, June.
    4. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
    5. Hayley H. Chouinard & Tobias Paterson & Philip R. Wandschneider & Adrienne M. Ohler, 2008. "Will Farmers Trade Profits for Stewardship? Heterogeneous Motivations for Farm Practice Selection," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(1), pages 66-82.
    6. Andrew J. Taylor, 2003. "Conditional Party Government and Campaign Contributions: Insights from the Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverage Industries," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(2), pages 293-304, April.
    7. Tripathi Micky & Ansolabehere Stephen & Jr James M. Snyder, 2002. "Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-26, August.
    8. Tripathi, Micky & Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M., 2002. "Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 131-155, August.
    9. Gary D. Lynne, 2002. "Agricultural Industrialization: A Metaeconomics Look at the Metaphors by which we Live," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 410-427.
    10. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    11. Gary D. Lynne, 2002. "Agricultural Industrialization: A Metaeconomics Look at the Metaphors by which we Live," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 410-427.
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