IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ajecsc/v68y2009i5p1135-1152.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corruption's Effect on Business Venturing Within the United States

Author

Listed:
  • David T. Mitchell
  • Noel D. Campbell

Abstract

In developing countries with high levels of corruption, people are often forced into small‐business venturing or survivalist entrepreneurship because larger, more efficient firms do not exist. In developed countries, however, low corruption means that people choose entrepreneurship as a better means of innovating. In this article we use federal convictions of state and local officials and the Small Business Administration's firm formation data to test whether corruption within the United States forces some people into business venturing. We find that business venturing within the United States is caused in part by corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • David T. Mitchell & Noel D. Campbell, 2009. "Corruption's Effect on Business Venturing Within the United States," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(5), pages 1135-1152, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:68:y:2009:i:5:p:1135-1152
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2009.00665.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2009.00665.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2009.00665.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    3. Gartner, William B., 1990. "What are we talking about when we talk about entrepreneurship?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 15-28, January.
    4. AlÌcia Adserý, 2003. "Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 445-490, October.
    5. Peter Johnson & Simon Parker, 1996. "Spatial Variations in the Determinants and Effects of Firm Births and Deaths," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(7), pages 679-688.
    6. Zoltan Acs & David Storey, 2004. "Introduction: Entrepreneurship and Economic Development," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(8), pages 871-877.
    7. Johnson, Peter & Parker, Simon, 1994. "The Interrelationships between Births and Deaths," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 283-290, August.
    8. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross‐Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
    9. Glaeser, Edward L. & Saks, Raven E., 2006. "Corruption in America," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1053-1072, August.
    10. Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1445-1473.
    11. Alberto F. Ades & Edward L. Glaeser, 1995. "Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 195-227.
    12. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andres Jauregui & Kirk C. Heriot & David T. Mitchell, 2021. "Corruption and formal-sector entrepreneurship in a middle-income country: spatial analysis of firm births in the Mexican states," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 1957-1972, December.
    2. Francesco Decarolis & Cristina Giorgiantonio, 2020. "Corruption red flags in public procurement: new evidence from Italian calls for tenders," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 544, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    3. Noel Campbell & Adriana S. Cordis, 2014. "Expected corruption and business formation," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 3(2), pages 292-305, October.
    4. Nageri Kamaldeen Ibraheem & Gunu Umar, 2020. "Corruption and Ease of Doing Business: Evidence from ECOWAS," Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 8(1), pages 19-37, October.
    5. Neiva de Figueiredo, João, 2013. "Are corruption levels accurately identified? The case of U.S. states," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 134-149.
    6. Jamie Bologna & Amanda Ross, 2015. "Corruption and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from a Random Audit Program," Working Papers 15-05, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    7. Ali Hussein Samadi, 2019. "Institutions and entrepreneurship: unidirectional or bidirectional causality?," Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research, Springer;UNESCO Chair in Entrepreneurship, vol. 9(1), pages 1-16, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides, 2008. "Fiscal policy, rent seeking, and growth under electoral uncertainty: theory and evidence from the OECD," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(4), pages 1375-1405, November.
    2. Andreas Kyriacou & Oriol Roca sagalés, 2009. "Fiscal descentralization and the quality of government: evidence from panel data," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 189(2), pages 131-155, June.
    3. Ahmet Faruk Aysan & …mer Faruk Baykal & Marie-Ange Véganzonès–Varoudakis, 2011. "The Effects of Convergence in Governance on Capital Accumulation in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Countries," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur & David Sunderland (ed.), Does Economic Governance Matter?, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Ahmet Faruk AYSAN & Mustapha Kamel NABLI & Marie‐Ange VÉGANZONÈS‐VAROUDAKIS, 2007. "Governance Institutions And Private Investment: An Application To The Middle East And North Africa," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 45(3), pages 339-377, September.
    5. Abdih, Yasser & Chami, Ralph & Dagher, Jihad & Montiel, Peter, 2012. "Remittances and Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 657-666.
    6. Kerekes, Carrie B. & Williamson, Claudia R., 2008. "Unveiling de Soto's mystery: property rights, capital formation, and development," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 299-325, December.
    7. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    8. Harashima, Taiji, 2017. "Should a Government Fiscally Intervene in a Recession and, If So, How?," MPRA Paper 78053, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Du, Julan & Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang, 2012. "Institutions and FDI location choice: The role of cultural distances," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 210-223.
    10. Boschini, Anne & Pettersson, Jan & Roine, Jesper, 2013. "The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 19-41.
    11. John McArthur & Francis Teal, 2002. "Corruption and firm performance in Africa," CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-10, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    12. Buitrago R., Ricardo E. & Barbosa Camargo, María Inés, 2021. "Institutions, institutional quality, and international competitiveness: Review and examination of future research directions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 423-435.
    13. Arminen, Heli & Menegaki, Angeliki N., 2019. "Corruption, climate and the energy-environment-growth nexus," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 621-634.
    14. Sharmistha Self & Richard Grabowski, 2006. "Agricultural Development, State Effectiveness And Long-Run Economic Development," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 31(2), pages 73-90, December.
    15. Pol Antràs, 2005. "Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1054-1073, September.
    16. Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2007. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from Audit Reports," IZA Discussion Papers 2843, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Eslamloueyan, Karim & Jafari, Mahboubeh, 2019. "Do better institutions offset the adverse effect of a financial crisis on investment? Evidence from East Asia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 154-172.
    18. Altug, Sumru & Filiztekin, Alpay & Pamuk, Şevket, 2008. "Sources of long-term economic growth for Turkey, 1880–2005," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 393-430, December.
    19. Mauricio Cárdenas, 2007. "Economic Growth in Colombia : a reversal of "fortune"?," Revista ESPE - Ensayos sobre Política Económica, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 25(53), pages 220-259, January.
    20. Axel Dreher & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Friedrich Schneider, 2014. "The devil is in the shadow. Do institutions affect income and productivity or only official income and official productivity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 121-141, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:68:y:2009:i:5:p:1135-1152. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0002-9246 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.