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Historical regulation of Victoria's water sector: A case of government failure?

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This paper analyses the role of government failure in Victoria's water sector between 1905 and 1984 as evidenced in the rise of in-stream salinity. It will be shown that high levels of salinity can, in part, be attributed to regulatory failure for two reasons. First, the method of water allocation, a compulsory minimum charge with the marginal cost of water being zero, encouraged over watering, resulting in increased water tables via groundwater recharge. Second, the government did not provide adequate finance for construction of appropriate removal of saline drainage water, and thereby allowed increasing in-stream salinity. Copyright 2007 The Author Journal compilation 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd .

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  • E. Harris, 2007. "Historical regulation of Victoria's water sector: A case of government failure? ," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 51(3), pages 343-352, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajarec:v:51:y:2007:i:3:p:343-352
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    1. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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    Cited by:

    1. Edwyna Harris, 2011. "The Impact of Institutional Path Dependence on Water Market Efficiency in Victoria, Australia," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 25(15), pages 4069-4080, December.
    2. Pim Derwort & Nicolas Jager & Jens Newig, 2019. "Towards productive functions? A systematic review of institutional failure, its causes and consequences," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 52(2), pages 281-298, June.
    3. Jason Hackworth, 2009. "Normalizing ‘Solutions’ to ‘Government Failure’: Media Representations of Habitat for Humanity," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 41(11), pages 2686-2705, November.

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