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Collective action problems in macroprudential policy and the need for international coordination

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  • Vinals, J.
  • Nier, E.

Abstract

There is increasing recognition in the academic and policymaking communities that dedicated macroprudential policies are needed to reduce the frequency and severity of financial crises. The main theme brought out by this article is that in a globally interconnected world, a range of collective action problems lead to “too little” macroprudential policy action, from both a national and a global perspective. This reinforces inherent biases in favor of inaction or insufficiently forceful and timely macroprudential action at the national level. A combination of guidance by standard setters, international surveillance, and regional coordination mechanisms is needed to reduce collective action problems and enhance the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in the pursuit of global financial stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Vinals, J. & Nier, E., 2014. "Collective action problems in macroprudential policy and the need for international coordination," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 18, pages 39-46, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bfr:fisrev:2014:18:05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Viral V. Acharya, 2003. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2745-2782, December.
    2. Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2013. "How Do Global Liquidity Phases Manifest Themselves in Asia?," ADB Reports RPT136042-3, Asian Development Bank (ADB), revised 05 Nov 2013.
    3. Erland W. Nier, 2011. "Macroprudential Policy - Taxonomy And Challenges," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 216(1), pages 1-15, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fendoğlu, Salih, 2017. "Credit cycles and capital flows: Effectiveness of the macroprudential policy framework in emerging market economies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 110-128.
    2. Rubio, Margarita, 2020. "Cross-country spillovers from macroprudential regulation: Reciprocity and leakage," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    3. Bengtsson, Elias, 2020. "Macroprudential policy in the EU: A political economy perspective," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 46(C).
    4. Teresa Czerwinska, 2015. "Recovery and Resolution – New Mechanisms for Systemic Risk Management in the Insurance Sector (Restrukturyzacja i uporzadkowana likwidacja – jako nowe instrumenty zarzadzania ryzykiem systemowym w sek," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 13(55), pages 220-236.

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