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Why a FOMC member is a hawk or a dove? Ideology and Politics
[Pourquoi un décideur est-il un « faucon » ou une « colombe » ? Idéologie et orientation politique]

Author

Listed:
  • Michael D. BORDO
  • Klodiana ISTREFI

Abstract

Economic research – Monetary policy decisions typically arise from the deliberation and vote of a committee. Committees are in a continuous flux as personalities change, preferences change and majorities change. Who sits in these committees and what molds their preference on monetary policy? The authors discuss these questions with regard to the body that decides on monetary policy in the United States, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve. They highlight ideology by education and early life economic experience of the FOMC members that served during the last 55 years. As these members are appointed, authors discuss as well whom politicians choose for the FOMC. Recherche économique – Les décisions de politique monétaire sont généralement le fruit des délibérations et du vote d’un comité. Les comités sont en évolution perpétuelle car les personnes, les préférences et les majorités changent. Qui participe à ces comités et comment leurs orientations de politique monétaire sont-elles façonnées ? Les auteurs examinent ces questions pour l’organe qui décide de la politique monétaire aux États-Unis : le Comité fédéral de l’open market (FOMC) du Système fédéral de réserve. Ils soulignent l’importance de l’idéologie liée à la formation académique et de l’expérience économique vécue durant la jeunesse des membres du FOMC ayant siégé au cours des 55 dernières années. Dans la mesure où ces membres sont nommés, les auteurs étudient ceux que les responsables politiques choisissent.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael D. BORDO & Klodiana ISTREFI, 2019. "Why a FOMC member is a hawk or a dove? Ideology and Politics [Pourquoi un décideur est-il un « faucon » ou une « colombe » ? Idéologie et orientation politique]," Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 224.
    • Handle: RePEc:bfr:bullbf:2019:224:04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bordo, Michael & Istrefi, Klodiana, 2023. "Perceived FOMC: The making of hawks, doves and swingers," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 125-143.
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    3. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226520018 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Herbert Stein, 1994. "Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Clinton," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53215, September.
    5. Beck, Nathaniel, 1982. "Parties, Administrations, and American Macroeconomic Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 83-93, March.
    6. Allan H. Meltzer, 2005. "Origins of the Great Inflation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 87(Mar), pages 145-176.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E03 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Macroeconomics
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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