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Foundations of Contemporary Economics: Elinor Ostrom and Common Pool Resources

Author

Listed:
  • Henrik Egbert
  • Teodor Sedlarski
  • Aleksandar B. Todorov

Abstract

Elinor Ostrom changed the way of thinking about common-pool resources in economics. She provided an institutional analysis that shows how groups can find solutions to complex problems for collective goods. Ostrom showed that collective action can work among rational individuals. She and her husband Vincent objected privatization, nationalization, and centralized government for governing the commons. Instead, they promoted polycentric governance as a solution for many common-pool resources. Her approach is known as the Bloomington School of Political Economy, a thriving direction in Public Choice Theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Henrik Egbert & Teodor Sedlarski & Aleksandar B. Todorov, 2023. "Foundations of Contemporary Economics: Elinor Ostrom and Common Pool Resources," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 5, pages 554-571.
    • Handle: RePEc:bas:econth:y:2023:i:5:p:554-571
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William Mitchell, 1988. "Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 101-119, February.
    2. Kenneth Shepsle, 2010. "Elinor Ostrom: uncommon," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 335-337, June.
    3. Harold Hotelling, 1931. "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 137-137.
    4. Ostrom, Vincent & Tiebout, Charles M. & Warren, Robert, 1961. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 831-842, December.
    5. Aligica, Paul Dragos, 2013. "Institutional Diversity and Political Economy: The Ostroms and Beyond," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199843909.
    6. Paul Aligica, 2015. "Public Administration, Public Choice and the Ostroms: the achievements, the failure, the promise," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 111-127, April.
    7. E. Ostrom, 2010. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 1, pages 5-52.
    8. Elinor Ostrom, 2008. "Institutions And The Environment," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 24-31, September.
    9. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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