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Changes in the Japanese Postwar Corporate Governance System in the 1990s

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  • Nikolay Trifinov Naydenov

Abstract

The study deals with the specific features of Japanese corporate governance that can be summarized in: 1) insider control system with internal disciplining mechanisms based on lifetime employment and the employee ambition for promotion, and 2) internalized monitoring by external stakeholders through establishment of long-term interfirm relationships within a common grouping based on cross shareholding and corporate interconnectedness. The traditional corporate control mechanisms – internal and external – in Japanese companies until the 1990s have been analyzed, as well as the objectives of corporate managers in Japan. The changes in the corporate governance system have been traced both in the formal institutional framework and in economic practices. The changes in employment relations have been discussed as the basis of the internal disciplining mechanisms. In conclusion, the incompleteness of the changes in the corporate governance system, and the possible directions for its future development have been analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolay Trifinov Naydenov, 2005. "Changes in the Japanese Postwar Corporate Governance System in the 1990s," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 3, pages 124-150.
  • Handle: RePEc:bas:econst:y:2005:i:3:p:124-150
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • P12 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Enterprises
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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