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The Impact of Rules on Economic Activity

Author

Listed:
  • Veronica Coca

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present the importance of the rules, the importance of those rules that influence economic activity. It will be presented the institutions starting from the "rules of the game" until the "rule of law". Then it will be explained the concept of "spontaneous order" and the importance of that order in society. For a good economic activity, we need a “good governance”. It will be explained what this means good governance and how addiction affects about institutional change.

Suggested Citation

  • Veronica Coca, 2010. "The Impact of Rules on Economic Activity," Studies and Scientific Researches. Economics Edition, "Vasile Alecsandri" University of Bacau, Faculty of Economic Sciences, issue 15.
    • Handle: RePEc:bac:fsecub:10-15-33
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Greif, Avner, 2008. "Contract enforcement and institutions among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie," MPRA Paper 9610, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    3. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-250, June.
    4. Erica Field, 2007. "Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1561-1602.
    5. Avinash Dixit, 2009. "Governance Institutions and Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 5-24, March.
    6. Timothy Besley, 2007. "The New Political Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(524), pages 570-587, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rules; governance; path dependence; order; institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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