IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aou/nszioz/y2017i1p71-88.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Partnership Organizational Mechanism In Rural Areas Development: Stakeholders Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Vilma ATKOČIŪNIENĖ
  • Eglė ŠTAREIKĖ

Abstract

Process of rural areas development becoming more open and complex. lmpact of stakeholders is getting more elear and transparent for decisions and acts which are done in rural areas. Success and effectiveness of development initiatives ensuring stakeholder's goals that need to be linked with development purposes of rural organizations, which are implemented acting in partnership. Partnership organizational mechanism synchronizes actions and interactions of stakeholders and other elements of the mechanism, organizational changes and also combines interests of stakeholders and motivates them to engage and participate in rural development initiatives in order to solve existing problems. The purpose of this article - to define partnership organizational mechanism and determine stakeholders related with mechanism's functioning. During the investigation the evolution of the mechanism concept was analyzed, that created preconditions for creation of concept of partnership organizational mechanism in rural areas development. The missions analysis of Lithuania's 51 local action groups development strategies (2007-2013 year) allowed to identify stakeholders, that are related to partnership organizational mechanism functioning in rural areas development.

Suggested Citation

  • Vilma ATKOČIŪNIENĖ & Eglė ŠTAREIKĖ, 2017. "Partnership Organizational Mechanism In Rural Areas Development: Stakeholders Analysis," Nowoczesne Systemy Zarządzania. Modern Management Systems, Military University of Technology, Faculty of Security, Logistics and Management, Institute of Organization and Management, issue 1, pages 71-88.
    • Handle: RePEc:aou:nszioz:y:2017:i:1:p:71-88
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://nsz.wat.edu.pl/pdf-129451-56451
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Aligica, 2006. "Institutional and Stakeholder Mapping: Frameworks for Policy Analysis and Institutional Change," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 79-90, March.
    2. Philip Lowe & Neil Ward, 2007. "Sustainable rural economies: some lessons from the English experience," Sustainable Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(5), pages 307-317.
    3. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1973. "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 1-30, May.
    4. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    5. Andre Torre & Bertrand Zuindeau, 2009. "Proximity economics and environment: assessment and prospects," Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(1), pages 1-24.
    6. Tony Killick, 2001. "Globalisation and the Rural Poor," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 19(2), pages 155-180, June.
    7. Helene Rey-Valette & Sylvie Lardon & Eduardo Chia, 2008. "Editorial: governance – institutional and learning plans facilitating the appropriation of sustainable development," International Journal of Sustainable Development, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 11(2/3/4), pages 101-114.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rahman, H.M. Tuihedur & Hickey, Gordon M. & Sarker, Swapan Kumar, 2012. "A framework for evaluating collective action and informal institutional dynamics under a resource management policy of decentralization," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 32-41.
    2. Hugh-Jones, David & Reinstein, David, 2012. "Anonymous rituals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 478-489.
    3. Karla Hoff & Mayuresh Kshetramade & Ernst Fehr, 2011. "Caste and Punishment: the Legacy of Caste Culture in Norm Enforcement," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(556), pages 449-475, November.
    4. Aurora García‐Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzís, 2009. "Market Effects of Changes in Consumers' Social Responsibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 235-262, March.
    5. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2020. "The Social Costs of Side Trading," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(630), pages 1608-1622.
    6. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008. "Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND," Working Papers FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008.
    7. Josheski Dushko & Karamazova Elena, 2021. "Auction theory and a note on game mechanisms," Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics, Sciendo, vol. 7(1), pages 43-59, May.
    8. Qin, Botao & Shogren, Jason, 2023. "Endogenous Social Norms, Mechanism Design, and Payment for Environmental Services," MPRA Paper 112878, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Folkersen, Maja Vinde, 2018. "Ecosystem valuation: Changing discourse in a time of climate change," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 29(PA), pages 1-12.
    10. Kerri Brick & Martine Visser & Justine Burns, 2012. "Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence from South African Fishing Communities," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(1), pages 133-152.
    11. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May.
    12. Evans, Alecia & Sesmero, Juan, 2022. "Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Correlated Noisy Payoffs: Theory and Experimental Evidence," 2021 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Austin, Texas 322804, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    13. Lane, Tom & Miller, Luis & Rodriguez, Isabel, 2024. "The normative permissiveness of political partyism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    14. Gonzalo Olcina & Vicente Calabuig, 2015. "Coordinated Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(2), pages 147-173, April.
    15. Vu, Trung V., 2021. "Do genetically fragmented societies respond less to global warming? Diversity and climate change policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    16. Warr, Peter G., 1974. "The Economics Of Shadow Pricing: Market Distortions And Public Investment," Staff Papers 14116, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    17. Kaori Tembata & Kenji Takeuchi, 2016. "Collective decision-making under drought: An empirical study of water resource management in Japan," Discussion Papers 1646, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    18. Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 65-89, September.
    19. Chavez, Alex K. & Bicchieri, Cristina, 2013. "Third-party sanctioning and compensation behavior: Findings from the ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 268-277.
    20. Erin L. Krupka & Roberto A. Weber, 2013. "Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 495-524, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aou:nszioz:y:2017:i:1:p:71-88. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michał Jurek (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://nsz.wat.edu.pl/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.