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Group Incentives for Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management

Author

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  • Kathleen Segerson

    (Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, USA)

Abstract

Group incentives can and have been used to address a range of environmental and resource problems. These schemes base individual penalties and/or rewards on the performance of a group of individuals or firms who contribute to the environmental or resource problem. The economics literature on team incentives and public goods, as well as the literature specifically on environmental and natural resource management, provides insights into the design of group incentives. This article reviews the literature on group incentives in the context of environmental protection and natural resource policy. This literature suggests that group incentives can be effective and even efficient as environmental policy tools. However, the outcomes under group incentives will likely depend on a combination of the policy design and the nature of the internal group interactions. Within-group interactions are likely to be particularly important when policies involve thresholds so that coordination is needed to reach a cooperative equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Kathleen Segerson, 2022. "Group Incentives for Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 597-619, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:anr:reseco:v:14:y:2022:p:597-619
    DOI: 10.1146/annurev-resource-111920-020235
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    Cited by:

    1. Rosas-Munoz, Juan & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2024. "When should the regulator be left alone in the commons? How fishing cooperatives can help ameliorate inefficiencies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ambient taxes; collective action; collective quotas; environmental policy; group incentives; payments for ecosystem services;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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